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ABSTRACT 
MICAH NATHANIEL LEVINSON: The Origins of Secessionist Conflict: Predicting When 
Governments Will and Will Not Permit Secession 
(Under the direction of Gary Marks) 
 
A question understudied in the literature on separatist conflict is why some governments 
permit secession to occur peacefully while others resist it militarily. To fill that gap, this 
dissertation presents a model that explains why dictatorships virtually always resort to military 
force to thwart self-determination movements while democracies usually permit secession. 
Dictators need a tough image to deter potential revolutionaries and palace coups and fear that 
ignoring separatist activity, even if it poses no direct threat to their rule, signals vulnerability that 
may encourage political rivals to challenge them. Peaceful secession from non-democracies only 
occurs when dictators initiate the separation for their own benefit, thereby avoiding the 
appearance of regime vulnerability. 
The electorates of democracies, on the other hand, are reluctant to incur the costs of 
suppressing secessionist movements. An exception is when there exists in the territory claimed 
by the secessionists an enfranchised loyalist population that has reason to fear persecution should 
the secessionists win independence. When loyalists’ livelihood depends on continued rule by the 
metropolis, the magnitude of the benefit to them of thwarting secession far exceeds the diffused 
cost to the metropolis’s population of waging an anti-secessionist counterinsurgency. 
Consequently, if loyalists are enfranchised, they mostly become single-issue voters when 
secessionists threaten their privileged status and are able to out organize the peace camp.  
 iv 
This dissertation uses crisp set qualitative comparative analysis of the population of 
secessionist movements active between 1961 and 2007 and case studies to test its hypotheses. 
And, except for some anomalies surrounding India’s counterinsurgencies in her Northeastern 
states and Kashmir, the model accounts for the entire population of cases. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The study of civil war is burgeoning as the incidence of interstate war decreases and civil 
wars represent an increasing percentage of the world’s conflicts. Topics receiving exhaustive 
attention include why groups rebel (Horowitz 1985, Gurr 1993, Collier 2000, Fearon and Laitin 
2003, Hegre and Sambanis 2006), the prerequisites of the successful rebellion (Herbst 2000, Le 
Billon, 2001, Ross 2004, Buhaug and Rod, 2006, de Soysa and Neumayer 2007), and why civil 
wars tend to last longer than interstate wars (Walter 2009a). However, a critical question that 
remains understudied is why some governments permit secession to occur peacefully while 
others resist it militarily. 
Filling this gap is essential to averting secessionist conflicts, which killed more than 5 
million combatants and even more civilians over the twentieth-century.1 Since underestimating a 
government’s resolve is one of the main sources of war (Fearon 1995), a model that reliably 
predicts governments’ tenacity in opposing secession enables potential separatists to assess how 
sanguinary the consequences of their activities will be and act accordingly. 
Using crisp set qualitative comparative analysis (csQCA) of the population of 
secessionist movements active since 1961, this dissertation reaches three conclusions: (1) Non-
democratic regimes, at least initially, always refuse to accede to secessionists’ demands and 
resort to military force to prevent it. (2) The only time that peaceful secession from non-
democracies occurs is when dictators initiate the separation for their own benefit in the absence 
                                                 
1Bridget L. Coggins (2011) “The History of Secession: An Overview,” in Aleksandar Pavkovic and Peter Radan, 
ed.s, The Ashgate Research Companion to Secession. Surrey: Ashgate. p. 32. 
 2 
of groups prepared to fight to achieve independence. (3) Democracies permit secession except 
when there exists in the territory claimed by the secessionists an enfranchised loyalist population 
that has reason to fear persecution should the secessionists win independence. To illustrate and 
reinforce the findings of the csQCA analysis, this dissertation provides case studies representing 
different configurations of the dependent and independent variables. 
The model presented in this dissertation may also contribute to resolving historical 
puzzles such as why the Federal Government invaded the Confederacy in 1861. Although there 
exists prodigious literature analyzing the reasons for Southern secession, the Lincoln 
Administration’s motives for suppressing the secessionists remain largely unexamined.2 The 
sparse writing on the subject appears to take Lincoln at his word when he stated in his first 
inaugural address, “In your hands, my dissatisfied fellow countrymen, and not in mine, is the 
momentous issue of civil war.” However, it was the Lincoln Administration’s choice to block 
secession, not the Southern states seceding, that triggered the Civil War. And, the 
Administration’s decision was not foreordained, as Lincoln’s predecessor, James Buchanan,3 and 
a majority of Northern newspapers opposed using military force to preserve the Union in early 
1861.4 
                                                 
2Russell McClintock (2008) Lincoln and the Decision for War: The Northern Response to Secession. Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press. p. 3. “Despite the profound significance of the North's reaction, Kenneth M. 
Stampp's And the War Came remains, over half a century after its initial publication, the only comprehensive study 
of the North during the secession crisis. Before Stampp and since, the considerable literature on this aspect of the 
crisis has tended to focus on a few specific areas. A number of books and articles have addressed the response of 
particular Northern regions or localities to the crisis, but few have done so with an eye to any larger significance.” 
3Shearer Davis Bowman (2010) At the Precipice: Americans North and South During the Secession Crisis. Chapel 
Hill: University of North Carolina Press. p. 263. 
4Howard C. Perkins (1942) Northern Editorials on Secession. New York: Appleton-Century. 
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Most of the literature defines “secession” as the withdrawal of a territory and its 
population from an existing state to create a new state and excludes cases of irredentism and 
decolonization (Wood 1981, Bartkus 1999, Pavkovic and Radan 2007, Sorens 2012). Horowitz 
(1998) categorizes secessionism and irredentism as similar but discrete phenomena that deserve 
separate analysis, partly because the former is far more prevalent than the latter. He attributes 
secessionism’s greater frequency to actors in the potentially irredentist state fearing that 
territorial expansion could dilute their influence and ethnic leaders in secessionist regions 
generally preferring the benefits of national leadership in a smaller state to becoming merely 
regional leaders in a larger irredentist one. 
The most frequent rationale for decoupling decolonization from secession is their 
contrasting treatment in international law. Pavkovic and Radan (2007) and Sorens (2012) justify 
excluding cases of decolonization from their respective studies of secessionism by appealing to 
UN General Assembly Resolutions 1514 and 1541. Resolution 1514, entitled “Declaration on the 
Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,” proclaims the “necessity of 
bringing to a speedy and unconditional end colonialism in all its forms and manifestations” with 
the caveat that “any attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and the 
territorial integrity of a country is incompatible with the purposes and principles of the Charter of 
the United Nations.” Thus, Resolution 1514 legitimizes decolonization while delegitimizing 
secession. 
This raises the question of what determines whether a territory is a colony. Passing with 
the support of the communist bloc and most of the developing countries, Resolution 1542 
designates only territories that are “geographically separate” from the metropolis as colonies, 
known thereafter as the “saltwater criterion.” This resolution thereby restricted the definition of 
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colonialism to transoceanic European empires while excluding Soviet control of the Baltic 
States, the Chinese occupation of Tibet, and the Arab-dominated Sudanese government’s 
exploitation of the racially and religiously distinct southern part of country. Sorens (2012) 
concedes that saltwater criterion appears arbitrary while Pomerance (1982) and Hannum (1990) 
imply that the contrasting approaches to decolonization and secessionism in international law 
derive more from political expediency than a logically coherent distinction between the two 
phenomena. 
Betts (1968) offers a rare theory-grounded rationale for distinguishing between 
contiguous and non-contiguous polities, arguing that “the closer the dominated territory to the 
dominating power, the greater the opportunity for political relatedness [as] contiguous 
imperialism usually results in political absorption.”5 In contrast, he observes that remote colonies 
require a political administration separate from that of the metropolis, thereby precluding the 
evolution of a common culture and shared economic and political interests. From this Betts 
deduces that, in the long run, contiguous empires will prove more durable than non-contiguous 
ones. 
Despite Horowitz (1998) and Betts’s (1968) compelling arguments for treating 
secessionism, irredentism, and decolonization as distinct phenomena, this dissertation reveals 
that the same factors that determine whether a government will permit secession to occur 
peacefully also determine whether the government will permit peaceful irredentism or 
decolonization. Accordingly, when the term “secession” is used in this dissertation, it includes 
cases of irredentism and decolonization. 
                                                 
5Raymond F. Betts (1968) Europe Overseas: Phases of Imperialism. New York: Basic Books. p. 7 
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While this dissertation does not differentiate among cases of secessionism, irredentism, 
and decolonization, it does distinguish between secessionist and revolutionary movements. The 
distinction is relevant because regimes, which are primarily interested in preserving themselves, 
will react differently to a threat to some territory under their control than to a threat to their 
survival. Surrendering territory may actually reinforce a regime because fighting an anti-
secessionist war drains resources that it could otherwise invest in strengthening its domestic 
position. The risks of not ceding territory when the cost of retention is exorbitant is demonstrated 
by the Portuguese officers who launched the 1974 Carnation Revolution, which overthrew the 
country’s fascist dictatorship, principally to end the colonial wars in Africa. 
The scant literature on whether governments will permit secession to occur peacefully 
follows four approaches: (1) reputation models, (2) veto player models, (3) models comparing 
the relative ease of expropriating different types of assets, and (4) democratic peace theory. And, 
as this dissertation demonstrates, each of these approaches suffers from shortcomings. All that 
we can glean from the literature is that democracies are more likely than dictatorships to permit 
secession. 
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CHAPTER 1: EXISTING MODELS OF WHEN  
GOVERNMENTS PERMIT SECESSION 
Reputation Model 
One branch of the reputation literature theorizes that actors sometimes have an interest in 
developing a reputation for toughness to deter others even when the cost of fighting always 
exceeds that of conceding. Selten (1978) and Kreps and Wilson (1982) employ such models to 
describe how a monopolist could have an incentive to confront new entrants to the market, 
through temporary price-cutting, even when the cost of confrontation always exceeds the cost of 
accommodation. Subsequently, Jervis (1988) applies the concept to interstate war, arguing that a 
country might benefit from fighting a war that it knows from the outset that it will lose because 
such behavior projects an image of high resolve and toughness. Such a reputation, he maintains, 
can strengthen even a militarily weak state’s bargaining position if it leads other countries to 
infer that the state is willing to fight despite its weakness. 
Walter (2009b) imports this logic to the study of secessionist conflict, claiming that 
governments repress secessionist movements to deter other groups from seceding in the future. 
Accordingly, we should expect secessionist conflicts primarily in countries containing multiple 
groups prone to secession. She also argues that politicians decreasingly care about their 
reputation, including their reputation for anti-secessionism, as their term in office ends. So, 
autocrats, whose tenure is not fixed, never moderate their reputation for opposing secession. 
Walter’s reputation model fails to explain a large percentage of the historical record. 
Many of the most brutal and longest-standing secessionist conflicts occurred in countries 
containing only one group prone to secession. For example, Israel has repeatedly blocked 
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Palestinian self-determination despite the absence of other potentially secessionist minorities in 
Israel. To explain away this supposedly anomalous case, Walter predicts that Israel will consent 
to a Palestinian state in the West Bank and “eventually agree to a division of Jerusalem.”6 
However, continued settlement construction in the West Bank and Prime Minister Netanyahu’s 
2015 campaign promise to prevent Jerusalem’s division and the creation of a Palestinian state 
casts doubt on that prediction. Moreover, the Israeli case is far from unique. Sri Lanka never 
expected any group but the Tamils to demand self-determination but still fought two wars (1983-
2002, 2002-2009) at the cost of up to 100,000 lives to quell the LTTE’s bid for an independent 
Tamil state. Walter’s reputation model also fails to account for Ankara’s efforts to suppress 
Kurdish secessionists because there exists no other minority group in Turkey that could feasibly 
attempt secession. 
On the other hand, governments facing multiple secessionist movements often peacefully 
accede to the secessionists’ demands. British Prime Minister David Cameron agreed to call a 
referendum on Scottish independence and respect the will of the Scottish voters. He adopted this 
position despite the existence of secessionist movements in Wales (Plaid Cymru) and Northern 
Ireland (Sinn Fein and the Social Democratic Labour Party). Likewise, the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia permitted Montenegro to secede in 2006 despite a simultaneous effort to dissuade 
Kosovo from declaring independence. 
A more profound weakness of Walter’s model is the failure to explain why governments 
or individual politicians should even care if a region secedes. She assumes that governments 
always oppose secession in principle and unjustifiably equates individual politicians’ interests 
                                                 
6Barbara F. Walter (2009) Reputation and Civil War: Why Separatist Conflicts Are So Violent. New York: 
Cambridge University Press. pp. 6-7. 
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with the unity of the state, arguing that they will only feel secure permitting secession as their 
retirement from political life approaches. And, since dictators are less likely than democratic 
leaders to know when their tenure will end, Walter posits that dictators will prove more likely to 
suppress secessionist activity. 
Permitting secession, however, may be to the political leadership’s advantage because a 
majority of the population of the metropolis often prefers decolonization to fighting costly 
colonial wars. For instance, most of the British public favored African decolonization under 
Prime Ministers Harold Macmillan and Harold Wilson and dispatching troops to quash the 
African independence movements would have been an electoral liability.7 More recently, many 
Conservative politicians in Britain actually wanted Scotland to secede because it was 
traditionally a stronghold of the rival Labour Party.8 
Even dictators may have an incentive to permit secession. In Portugal, the dictatorial 
Estado Novo government’s insistence on prosecuting its colonial wars led to its overthrow by 
battle-fatigued troops in the 1974 Carnation Revolution. Although Walter rightly notes that the 
historical record reveals that dictatorships are more likely than democracies to suppress 
secessionist activity, her proposed causal mechanisms do not hold water. 
 
Veto Player Model 
Tsebelis (2002) defines “veto players” as actors whose consent is required to change the 
status quo and argues that having more veto players decreases the probability of policy change. 
                                                 
7Lawrence James (1994) The Rise and Fall of the British Empire. London: Little, Brown. p. 589. 
8Simon Johnson. “Tory MPs Secretly Want Scotland Independence for Westminster Majority’ Claims Lord 
Forsyth,” The Telegraph, 4 Nov. 2013. 
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The number of veto players is a function of the number of parties and the degree of party 
discipline. When two parties pursue the median voter, policy will more closely reflect broad 
electoral concerns than in multiparty systems that become beholden to niche interests through 
logrolling in coalition negotiations. Party discipline minimizes logrolling within parties. 
Inspired by Tsebelis, Spruyt (2005) claims that the greater the number of veto players in a 
political system, the easier it is for opponents of secession (e.g. colonial armies, metropolitan 
business interests that profit from the territory, and settlers) to scupper negotiations with 
separatists. He expects majority party governments that are also characterized by party discipline 
to prove more accommodating of secessionists than coalition governments, which become 
beholden to anti-secessionist interests through logrolling in coalition negotiations. To support 
this hypothesis, Spruyt compares Britain’s peaceful decolonization of Kenya and the Central 
African Federation by Macmillan’s Conservative-majority government with the anti-secessionist 
counterinsurgencies waged by French, Dutch, and Israeli coalition governments in Algeria, 
Indonesia, and the Palestinian territories respectively. 
He then extends this logic to dictatorships, claiming that oligarchical-authoritarian 
governments that depend on multiple constituencies (such as the armed forces, landed interests, 
and big business) are more likely to resist secession than unitary authoritarian governments that 
concentrate authority in a party or person and can thus alter policies with fewer obstacles. As 
evidence, he compares the collegial Salazar-Caetano dictatorship’s anticolonial wars in 
Portuguese Africa with Gorbachev and Yeltsin presiding over the peaceful dissolution of the 
Soviet Union. 
This analysis leaves some key questions unanswered, such as why successive 
majoritarian British governments militarily resisted Irish secessionism. Likewise, J. R. 
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Jayewardene’s United National Party controlled a large majority of Sri Lanka’s National State 
Assembly when it decided to repress the Tamil independence movement, precipitating the Sri 
Lankan Civil War. Conversely, a coalition government in Belgium engineered the rapid 
decolonization of the Congo, fearing that any delay would provoke a colonial war along Algerian 
lines.9 
Drawing on war bargaining theory literature’s analysis of commitment and information 
problems, Cunningham (2014) disputes Spruyt’s hypothesis that increasing the number of veto 
points in a government necessarily increases the probability of secessionist conflict. Starting with 
the premise that states behave like rational unitary actors, war bargaining theory seeks to explain 
why countries wage wars that destroy resources that adversaries could otherwise share through a 
negotiated settlement reflecting the balance of power between them. The logic being that both 
sides would have been better off if they could have achieved the same final resolution without 
suffering the military costs. While countries may misjudge the military strength and resolve of 
their opponents, due to the costs of such miscalculations, war bargaining theory seeks to 
determine what prevents rational leaders from using diplomacy to avoid them. 
Fearon (1995) identifies three sources of bargaining failure: (1) private information, (2) 
commitment problems, and (3) divisibility issues. Governments possess private information 
about their military’s capabilities and strategy and about the resolve of the country’s population. 
This private information often leads to countries having conflicting expectations regarding a 
war’s likely outcome. Each country honestly divulging its strength would enable reaching a 
pareto-efficient settlement that avoids the destruction of resources. However, countries have an 
incentive to exaggerate their capabilities and resolve to improve their bargaining position, 
                                                 
9Roland Oliver and Anthony Atmore (1994) Africa Since 1800. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p. 231. 
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thereby undercutting the credibility of their claims. Moreover, if a country were to report its 
military’s capabilities and strategy to its adversaries, those adversaries could adapt to make those 
capabilities and strategy obsolete. Lastly, since states are prone to exaggerate their might and 
resolve, devaluing their signaling, states may seek war to reveal private information about their 
military capabilities. That is, a state may desire to fight a war to prove that it is more powerful 
than previously thought. 
Even when states enjoy reliable intelligence on their adversaries’ military capabilities and 
resolve, bargaining failure may occur when the balance of power among adversaries is likely to 
change (Fearon 1995, Wagner 2000, Powell 2006). This is because the initially weaker state 
cannot credibly commit not to demand a renegotiation of the distribution of resources after its 
power waxes. Consequently, the temporarily stronger state may launch a preemptive war to 
prevent a shift in the balance of power. 
While Fearon concedes that bargaining failure could theoretically occur if the nature of 
the issue over which the countries are bargaining is indivisible, he contends that side-payments 
and broadening the negotiations to enable concessions on other issues makes issue indivisibility 
an unlikely source of bargaining failure among rational unitary actors. However, Fearon admits 
that, even when issues are not indivisible by nature, domestic politics can make them so. For 
Goddard (2006), this occurs when politicians lock themselves into bargaining positions in the 
pursuit of political advantage in domestic politics. Milosevic, for example, outmaneuvered his 
political competitors by portraying himself as the protector of Serbs in Kosovo and forging an 
alliance with Serbian nationalists. By adopting this strategy, however, he prevented himself from 
ever consenting to Kosovo’s independence because such a course would undermine his political 
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legitimacy and deprive him of the backing of the Serbian nationalists upon whom he had come to 
rely. 
Combining veto point and war bargaining theory, Cunningham concludes that the 
likelihood of governments negotiating an agreement with secessionists depends on the number of 
veto points in the government’s political system as well as the number of factions in the 
secessionist movement. On the government side, like Spruyt, Cunningham maintains that a large 
number of veto points decreases the probability of negotiating an agreement with secessionists 
because “veto factions have incentives to bargain hard and delay policy change to try to get 
compensation for their support.”10 Consequently, policy change, including accommodating 
secessionists, proves more costly as the government’s elite grows more divided. On the other 
hand, “when states are more divided, they are more credible bargaining partners for 
[secessionist] groups because, once concessions are made, changing policy to reverse them is 
more difficult than if the state were unitary [i.e. a dictatorship] or less divided.”11 In other words, 
an agreement precluding secessionist conflict is most likely when there is an intermediate 
number of veto points in the government. 
As for secessionist groups, Cunningham asserts that greater factionalization reduces the 
prospect of avoiding war because “many factions making disparate demands and claims about 
their strength make the capabilities and resolve of the SD [self determination] group as a whole 
difficult for the state to determine.”12 Furthermore, she argues that the ability of factions of 
                                                 
10Kathleen Gallagher Cunningham (2014) Inside the Politics of Self-determination. New York: Oxford University 
Press p. 29. 
11Ibid., p. 38. 
12Ibid., p. 104. 
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secessionist movements to act independently precludes any single faction from credibly 
promising to prevent a renewal of violence. 
Cunningham’s war bargaining model is slightly deceptive because two outliers, India and 
France, account for all of the countries with a high number of veto points. Those two countries 
aside, the model merely reinforces Walter’s finding that dictatorships (i.e. countries with few 
veto points) are more likely to resist secessionists militarily than democracies are. 
Similarly misplaced is the argument that greater factionalization of secessionist 
movements reduces the prospect of avoiding war because the ability of secessionist movement 
factions to act independently precludes any single faction from credibly promising to prevent a 
renewal of violence. A renewal of violence is not usually the commitment problem that 
secessionist groups pose to governments deliberating whether to permit secession or not because 
secessionists infrequently have irredentist designs on the rump state or the military capacity to 
threaten its security. Governments are more afraid of the secessionists reneging on commitments 
not to persecute loyalists remaining in the newly independent territory. 
Although Tir (2006) claims that examples of secessionist states attacking their rump 
counterparts can be easily found, the phenomenon is actually quite rare. He cites two cases. First, 
after gaining independence from the Ottoman Empire in 1908, Bulgaria captured additional 
Ottoman territory in the First Balkan War (1912-13). Second, Finland, which had been an 
autonomous part of the Russian Empire from 1809 to 1917, participated in Nazi Germany’s 
invasion of the Soviet Union. However, only the first case applies, as Finnish secession never 
endangered Russian security. After independence, Helsinki never threatened the Soviet Union 
with military conflict and only exploited the German invasion to redeem lands seized by the 
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Soviet Union in the 1939-40 Winter War.13 In fact, the only case in the last century of a 
secessionist state invading its rump counterpart is Eritrea’s 1998 invasion of Ethiopia, which 
resulted in a decisive Ethiopian victory. 
Still, the historical scarcity of secessionist states invading their rump counterparts does 
not negate the possibility that some governments oppose secession on security grounds. Powell 
(2006) discusses how the secession of territories that are a critical source of defense, such as the 
Sudentenland in Czechoslovakia or the Golan Heights in Israel, can weaken a state’s bargaining 
position, thereby necessitating additional concessions in the future. In the post-Second World 
War era, the refusal of successive Israeli governments to grant independence to the Palestinian 
territories is likely the sole case of a state opposing secession, at least in part, on security 
grounds. 
Israeli reluctance to withdraw from the West Bank partly stems from a desire for strategic 
depth and to prevent rocket attacks on Israel’s vital centers. Stripped of the West Bank, Israel’s 
narrow waist would shrink to nine miles lacking natural barriers. Moreover, this narrow waist 
contains 70 percent of Israel’s population, 80 percent of its industrial capacity, along with Ben 
Gurion Airport and the National Water Carrier.14 Since Israel’s defense relies on military 
reserves, losing the strategic depth afforded by the West Bank could enable a surprise attack to 
reach Israel’s major population centers and infrastructure before the Israel Defense Forces could 
mobilize.15 And, even if Israel could deter invasions from the West Bank, only a military 
                                                 
13Norman Rich (1974) Hitler’s War Aims: The Establishment of the New World Order. New York: Norton. pp. 400-
401. 
14Uzi Dayan (2014) “Defensible Borders to Ensure Israel’s Future,” in Dan Diker, ed., Israel’s Critical 
Requirements for Defensible Borders: The Foundation for a Secure Peace. Jerusalem: Jerusalem Center for Public 
Affairs. p. 35. 
15Dan Horowitz (1993) “The Israeli Concept of National Security,” in Yaniv Avner, ed., National Security and 
 15 
presence on the ground could prevent rocket attacks on Israeli cities like those emanating from 
the Gaza Strip.16 
However, even in the unique Israeli case, security is not the primary source of resistance 
to Palestinian statehood. Two Israeli prime ministers, Ehud Barak in 2001 and Ehud Olmert in 
2008, agreed to the creation of a Palestinian state that would encompass most of the West Bank. 
One of the main bones of contention between the Israeli and Palestinian negotiators was the fate 
of the Jewish settlers in the Palestinian territories. As Israeli governments have never trusted a 
Palestinian state to protect Jewish inhabitants, Jerusalem has always insisted that the largest 
settlement blocks remain part of Israel, a territorial demand rejected by the Palestinian Authority. 
Similarly, the British resisted Irish secessionism between 1919 and 1921 because 
Westminster did not trust IRA promises not to persecute Ireland’s Protestant loyalists. The fear 
was not of a renewal of violence directed against Britain should London concede to the IRA and 
pull its forces entirely out of Ireland. Likewise, the question in Algeria was whether any 
independence movement could credibly commit to not expelling the Pied-Noirs. 
While Cunningham addresses information and commitment problems, like Fearon, she 
ignores how the indivisibility of goods may preclude a negotiated settlement between 
governments and secessionists. Toft (2006), however, contends that secessionists often consider 
their “homeland” to be an “indivisible attribute of group identity”17 and prefer war to negotiating 
any territorial compromise that could make secession more palatable for the government. 
                                                 
Democracy in Israel. London: Lynne Rienner. p. 20. 
16Dore Gold (2014) “Regional Overview: How Defensible Borders Remain Vital for Israel,” in Dan Diker, ed., 
Israel’s Critical Requirements for Defensible Borders: The Foundation for a Secure Peace. Jerusalem: Jerusalem 
Center for Public Affairs. pp. 19-20. 
17Monica D. Toft (2006) “Issue Divisibility and Time Horizons as Rationalist Explanations for War,” Security 
Studies, 15(1) p. 38. 
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While secessionists often use uncompromising rhetoric, Toft’s complete reliance on the 
Chechen case obscures how secessionists regularly entertain territorial compromise. Irish 
independence came at the price of the island’s six northern counties. Likewise, Fatah, the 
dominant faction of the PLO, acknowledges that the price of an independent Palestine is 
partitioning the land between the Jordan and the Mediterranean Sea. However, it is true that 
violence usually precedes secessionists’ acceptance of partition. Usually the reason that 
governments demand partition in the first place is, again, to accommodate loyalists. The British 
insisted on retaining the Protestant-majority northern Irish counties while Jerusalem invariably 
conditions Palestinian independence on Israel retaining the Jewish settlement blocs in the West 
Bank. 
Asset Expropriation Model 
Asset expropriation models that were initially employed to explain why countries 
establish colonies were later used to discern the conditions under which governments relinquish 
them. Gallagher and Robinson (1953) allege that the primary objective of British imperialism 
was to acquire raw materials and food for Britain while opening new markets for her 
manufactured goods. As conducting trade requires the existence of a stable government and its 
acquiescence, Britain needed to impose a colonial government on potential trading partners 
lacking the indigenous political institutions to sustain a stable trading regime. Where stable 
governments already existed, such as China and most of Latin America, Gallagher and Robinson 
claim that Britain only needed to conduct occasional gunboat diplomacy to protect her 
commercial interests. 
Most of the subsequent literature on decolonization accepts the above paradigm. Like 
Gallagher and Robinson, Magdoff (1972) contends that imperialism involved colonial powers 
foisting social and economic institutions on colonies to cement a trading relationship between the 
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metropolis and colony characterized by dominance and exploitation. Once such social and 
economic institutions became entrenched, however, Magdoff concludes that colonial powers 
could often grant political independence to their colonies without threatening the privileged 
position of economic interests from the metropolis. 
Kahler (1981) paints a more nuanced picture than Magdoff, acknowledging that some 
assets can be expropriated more easily than others. Accordingly, Kahler posits that the type of 
assets owned by the colonists from the metropolis determines how resistant colonists will be 
toward decolonization. The more susceptible their assets are to expropriation, the greater their 
anticipated opposition to decolonization. Kahler then assumes that the colonial power’s attitude 
toward decolonization will reflect the preferences of the most politically influential bloc of 
colonists or metropolitan investors in the colony. 
Kahler suggests that agricultural assets are more vulnerable to expropriation than 
manufacturing as governments can replace farmers from the metropolis with local farmers. On 
the other hand, factories in the colony require continued investment and expertise from the 
metropolis to function, endowing manufacturers with greater bargaining leverage when facing a 
government with redistributive instincts. Therefore, according to Kahler, colonial powers will 
face greater resistance to decolonization in colonies where colonists are primarily engaged in 
agriculture. 
To illustrate his point, he compares the bloody French colonial war in Algeria with the 
more peaceful British decolonization of Africa. He attributes the difference to manufacturing’s 
greater importance in British Africa than in Algeria. Thus, Westminster ignored the objections to 
decolonization from white farmers because the manufacturing interests in British Africa feared 
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the consequences of an anticolonial struggle, namely economic disruption and alienating a likely 
future government, more than they feared decolonization. 
Kahler’s asset expropriation argument does not quite ring true. For instance, he overlooks 
near universal opposition to decolonization among white Rhodesians despite Rhodesia 
developing the largest manufacturing base of any British colony in Africa.18 The Rhodesian 
Front won 70% of the seats in the 1962 election on a platform of opposing decolonization and 
black majority rule. The reason that the British government could disregard vehement Rhodesian 
opposition to decolonization while France suffered tens of thousands of casualties to retain 
Algeria is because the Pied-Noirs could vote in French elections while the Rhodesians could not 
vote in British elections. 
Democratic Peace Theory Models 
The consensus that democracies never wage war against each other is so broad (Small 
and Singer 1976, Chan 1984, Doyle 1986, Russett 1993, Owen 1994) that the democratic peace 
is often called “the closest thing we have to an empirical law in the study of international 
relations” (Levy 1989). However, the consensus collapses when it comes to pinpointing the root 
of the democratic peace. Most explanations fall into one of two categories: normative models or 
structural models. 
Normative models. The normative models posit that political conflicts in democracies 
are resolved through compromise rather than violence and that, over time, the peaceful resolution 
of conflicts is internalized as a norm in democratic societies. It is argued that political leaders in 
democracies then apply this norm to the conduct of international affairs, preferring compromise 
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the Political Unity of White Rhodesia. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. p. 101. 
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to war. Yet, the historical record suggests that, even though democracies do not fight each other, 
they wage war as frequently as dictatorships, a phenomenon referred to as the “monadic 
hypothesis” (Small and Singer 1976, Chan 1984, Maoz and Abdolali 1989, Weede 1992, 
Quackenbush and Rudy 2009). 
Maoz and Russett (1993), who contend that democratic leaders prefer conciliation to 
conflict, attribute the monadic hypothesis to democracies jettisoning their favored pacific foreign 
policy when confronted by a non-democratic rival intent on exploiting their anti-militaristic 
norms. The problem with Maoz and Russett’s qualification of the normative model is that 
democracies often initiate the conflict and do so with a country that is too weak to pose a threat 
(e.g. the US 2003 invasion of Iraq). To reconcile the normative model of the democratic peace 
with democracies initiating wars against non-threatening countries, Risse-Kappen (1995) 
conjectures that democracies often “grotesquely exaggerate” the threat posed to them by 
dictatorships. He attributes this to democracies learning from repeated conflicts with 
dictatorships to suspect all of them of hostile intentions, whether it is warranted by circumstances 
or not. 
Yet, even Risse-Kappen’s modification of the normative model of the democratic peace 
cannot account for imperial wars waged in the 19th and 20th centuries by democratic powers, 
primarily Britain and France, against obviously unthreatening tribes and kingdoms in Asia and 
Africa. To account for these conflicts, Jackson (1993) and Weart (1998) hold that democratic 
leaders’ preference for conciliation over conflict only applies to peoples whom they deem their 
equals. And, the leaders of the Western democracies only recognized non-Europeans as their 
equals in the second half of the 20th century. 
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Jackson extends this logic to argue that European decolonization occurred in large part 
due to shifting norms in the European democracies and that, in the modern world, 
democratization should make states less resistant to secessionism in general. He claims that, 
prior to the Second World War, political elites in the democratic colonial powers deemed self-
determination a right belonging exclusively to those peoples that assumed Western cultural and 
political practices, such as the Japanese. According to Jackson, the exposure of Nazi war crimes 
delegitimized racial discrimination and spurred the Western democracies to accept that their non-
white colonial subjects were entitled to self-determination. 
Dictators, on the other hand, who do not share the democratic leader’s preference for 
conciliation, are less likely in Jackson’s view to permit decolonization or secession. He notes that 
the “final colonial or quasi-colonial systems to be dismantled were those of authoritarian powers: 
the Portuguese African empire, Ian Smith’s Rhodesia, apartheid South Africa, and, more 
recently, the Soviet Union.”19 Ultimately, Jackson concludes that political elites in democratic 
countries are more likely to internalize a respect for human rights that translates into granting 
independence to colonized peoples. He then interprets Moscow’s willingness to permit the 
secession of the non-Russian Soviet republics after the collapse of the Communist Party 
dictatorship as a reconfirmation of how democracy fosters an anti-imperialist ideology that 
impels decolonization. 
Ravlo, Gleditsch, and Dorussen (2003) empirically support Jackson’s findings. They 
examine all imperial and colonial wars from 1816 to 1992 and find that European democracies 
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were more likely than dictatorships to engage in such conflicts during the imperial period (1870-
1945), but were less likely to do so thereafter. 
Jackson rejects the possibility that elites in the metropolis adopted an anti-imperialist 
ideology to mask an involuntary retreat from empire stemming from the increasing cost of 
suppressing anti-colonial insurgents. Although he concedes that colonial powers’ military 
advantage over their indigenous adversaries diminished after the Second World War, he holds 
that the disorganized condition of many postcolonial countries proves that most anti-colonial 
forces lacked the strength to eject the Europeans and that genuine anti-imperialist sentiment in 
the metropolis, therefore, must have played the decisive role in decolonization. 
Yet, the issue is not whether each anti-colonial movement could militarily eject the 
European army from its midst. It is whether it could raise the cost of continued colonial 
occupation above that which the metropolis was willing to pay. As this dissertation will 
demonstrate, democratic leaders are generally more sensitive to the costs of secessionist and anti-
colonial insurgencies than dictators are. 
Furthermore, if decolonization stemmed from a common revulsion in the Western 
democracies at Nazi racism, one would not expect divergent reactions to their colonies’ demands 
for self-determination. Jackson’s theory cannot account for France fighting a bloody war in the 
1950s to retain Algeria while Britain simultaneously abandoned the Gold Coast peacefully. Even 
more problematic, if we assume that decolonization was motivated by the extension of the right 
of self-determination from westernized populations to all peoples, is Britain’s refusal to grant 
independence to Northern Ireland while decolonizing Africa. Lastly, Russia’s brutal campaign to 
forestall Chechen independence in the 1990s suggests that Boris Yeltsin and the other Russian 
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leaders who managed the dissolution of the Soviet Union had not in fact internalized democratic 
anti-imperialist norms. 
Structural models. Structural models of the democratic peace presuppose that political 
leaders seek to enrich themselves through wars whose costs are born by their subjects. Thus, the 
more accountable political leaders are to their subjects, the less likely the state is to wage 
aggressive war. Immanuel Kant, one of the earliest exponents of this theory, claimed in 
Perpetual Peace (1795) that if “the consent of the citizens is required to decide whether or not 
war is to be declared, it is very natural that they will have great hesitation in embarking on so 
dangerous an enterprise… But under a constitution where the subject is not a citizen, and which 
is therefore not republican, it is the simplest thing in the world to go to war.” 
More recently, Rummel (1983) expanded on this model, arguing that as political and 
economic freedom increase, the interests of the citizenry will grow more diverse. And, because 
waging war in democracies requires political leaders to secure broad popular support, the freer 
the democracy the more factions the political leaders must sway. Accordingly, Rummel 
maintains that the more democratic the regime, the less likely it is to wage war. However, this 
formulation of the structural model of the democratic peace does not account for the empirically 
well-supported finding that democracies fight wars as frequently as non-democracies and that 
they are not all defensive. 
Lake (1992) more specifically applies Kant and Rummel’s models of executive 
constraints impeding the waging of aggressive war to imperialism. He argues that non-
democratic states are more prone to military expansionism because a lack of accountability to the 
citizenry enables the political leaders to extract rents from the newly conquered lands. Following 
Lake’s logic, Goldsmith and He (2008) presume that non-democratic political leaders will resist 
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decolonization more violently because they stand to lose more from the discontinuation of rent 
extraction from colonies than do their democratic counterparts. 
From their analysis of decolonization from 1900 to 1994, Goldsmith and He deduce that 
democratic imperial states are more likely to permit their colonies to achieve independence 
peacefully. Using Polity IV as their barometer of democracy, they find that its measure of 
executive constraints is strongly related to permitting colonies to achieve independence 
peacefully and that no other aspect of democracy is significant. Yet, if executive constraints 
make governments less resistant to decolonization, how can we explain Ravlo et al.’s 
aforementioned finding that democracies were more likely to fight colonial wars between 1870 
and 1945 than were dictatorships? 
The discrepancy stems from Goldsmith and He’s decision to only count colonial wars in 
which the colony actually won independence. The problem with this approach is that all colonial 
powers, including democracies, successfully suppressed most anti-colonial movements before 
insurgents acquired more powerful arsenals in the second half of the twentieth century. The 
historical record vindicates Ravlo et al. distinguishing between democracies’ attitude towards 
decolonization before 1945 with their attitude thereafter. However, because we have already 
exposed the tenuousness of Ravlo et al.’s normative explanation for this distinction, we require a 
new theory to explain why non-democratic regimes have always, at least initially, opposed 
decolonization and secession more broadly while democracies have grown more tolerant of such 
movements since 1945. 
This chapter demonstrated how the existing theories of governments’ responses to 
secessionists do not comport with the historical record. Walter (2009b) cannot account for 
conflicts in countries with only one group prone to secession or governments permitting 
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secession despite facing multiple secessionist movements. The veto player models experience 
difficulty explaining why Britain, Spruyt’s (2005) paradigmatic case of a country with a low veto 
point political system, peacefully granted independence to its settler colonies in East and Central 
Africa just before waging an anti-secessionist counterinsurgency in Northern Ireland. Kahler’s 
(1981) asset expropriation model of European decolonization cannot explain the pivotal 
Rhodesian case. And lastly, the normative democratic peace theory models do not account for 
democracies’ variant reactions to secessionism while the structural models fail to explain 
democracies’ growing acceptance of secessionism. However, the conclusion shared by most of 
the scholar cited above – that dictatorships are more likely than democracies to resist secession 
militarily – deserves greater attention and is examined in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 2: THEORY 
 
A running theme throughout the literature discussed in the previous chapter is that 
dictatorships are more likely to resist secessionists militarily than democracies are. While Walter 
correctly recognizes dictators’ tendency to cultivate an image of toughness, she misidentifies the 
audience. When a dictator brutally suppresses secessionists, according to Walter, the target 
audience is all potential secessionists. Yet, as we have already mentioned, dictators often 
suppress secessionist movements despite the absence of any other ethnic or national group with 
separatist inclinations. 
In reality, dictators need a tough image to deter potential revolutionaries and coups from 
within the dictatorial elite. While no popular revolutionary movement has ever overthrown a 
consolidated democratic regime (Lipset 1960, Dawley 1976, Goodwin 2001), non-democratic 
regimes must be on constant guard against revolutionaries and violence against secessionists 
signals to potential revolutionaries that the non-democratic regime is not squeamish about using 
force. Although there is no preexisting literature linking anti-secessionist violence by non-
democratic regimes to deterring potential revolutionaries, Boudreau (2005) finds that 
dictatorships sometimes brutally suppress civil groups that pose no direct threat to their rule, like 
the Falun Gong in China, to “convince or coerce other social forces to back the state.”20 
Following that logic, this dissertation argues that, even though separatism does not inherently 
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threaten the survival of a regime, dictatorial or otherwise, non-democratic regimes will always, at 
least initially, attempt to suppress secessionist movements to coerce other social forces to back 
the state. 
Only consolidated democratic regimes are immune to revolution. The competitive 
authoritarian regimes of Milosevic in Serbia (overthrown in the 2000 Bulldozer Revolution) and 
Shevardnadze in Georgia (overthrown in the 2003 Rose Revolution) proved as susceptible to 
revolution as the sultanistic Somoza regime in Nicaragua and totalitarian Ceaușescu regime in 
Romania. Accordingly, this dissertation hypothesizes that all non-democratic governments, from 
competitive authoritarian regimes to totalitarian ones, will, at least initially, militarily resist 
secessionist activity. 
Dictators especially fear that ignoring political subversion, even if it poses no direct 
threat to their rule, signals vulnerability that may encourage political rivals within the regime to 
challenge them. Palace coups are more common than revolutions.21 In this manner Nikita 
Khrushchev sidelined Georgy Malenkov while Leonid Brezhnev later ousted Khrushchev. So a 
display of force against secessionists indicates to potential coup plotters that they face a potent 
adversary. 
Accordingly, dictators only permit secession when it will not signal vulnerability. This 
occurs when dictators initiate the separation for their own benefit and thus are not seen as 
placating secessionist groups. There are only two cases of this phenomenon, each of which is 
addressed is the case studies chapter. First, the Franco regime unilaterally decolonized Spanish 
Guinea in 1968, before the full crystallization of an anti-colonial movement, to curry favor with 
the Non-Aligned countries. Then, in 1991, Boris Yeltsin, the President of the Russian Soviet 
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Federative Socialist Republic, promoted the Soviet Union’s dissolution to outmaneuver his rival, 
Mikhail Gorbachev, the President of the Soviet Union. 
While non-democratic governments ordinarily resort to force to suppress secessionists, 
democracies are clearly more selective when it comes to opposing secession. Institutional 
constraints on democratic leaders account for most of that selectivity. Siverson (1995) and Reiter 
and Stam (2002) find that democratic governments only initiate wars that they are confident of 
winning and winning cheaply, the logic being that democratic politicians who lead their nation to 
military defeat or into high casualty producing conflicts will hemorrhage popular support and 
fall. Although their models address interstate war, the same reasoning applies to anti-secessionist 
counterinsurgencies. The French Fourth Republic collapsed because of its leaders’ failing war 
against the Algerian secessionists. Therefore, we should only expect democracies to wage anti-
secessionist counterinsurgencies that they are confident of winning cheaply. 
Yet, the inexpensive anti-secessionist war is a relic of the past. Gartzke and Rohner 
(2011) describe how “exogenous military capability shocks create the opportunity to reallocate 
territory through colonization.” At the beginning of the twentieth-century, the technological 
disparity between European colonial armies and their indigenous adversaries proved so wide that 
the cost of suppressing secessionist activity was negligible, enabling democracies to suppress far 
away insurgencies without their electorates paying a readily apparent cost. Hillaire Belloc 
famously captured this disparity in military technology in the quip, “Whatever happens, we have 
got/ The Maxim gun, and they have not.” 
This disparity shrank over the course of the century, however. And, by the late 1950s to 
the early 1960s, in part thanks to military aid from the Soviet Union and China, anti-colonial 
groups could marshal the firepower necessary to inflate the cost of anti-secessionist colonial 
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wars, costs that electorates in most democracies proved unwilling to pay. In a similar vein, 
Grossman and Iyigun (1997) aver that improvements in insurrection technology and increases in 
the size of the local population, thereby making it less manageable, can make colonization 
unprofitable, eventually triggering an abandonment of empire. 
Just as the cost of anti-colonial counterinsurgency mushroomed, Western electorates grew 
increasingly sensitive to casualties suffered in colonial wars. The literature on casualty aversion 
posits a positive correlation between the public’s willingness to sustain casualties and the 
importance of the issues at stake (Rielly 1987, Larson 1996, Larson and Savych 2005) and public 
perceptions of the economic and military value of empire rapidly reversed in the 1950s. 
Until the 1950s, a broad consensus existed in the European imperial powers that colonies 
provide economic benefits. At the beginning of the twentieth century, France’s empire already 
served as a captive market for politically influential industries, absorbing in 1914 40% of refined 
sugar exports, 56% of rail exports, 73% of the export of locomotives, 80% of metal construction 
exports, and 85% of cotton fabric exports.22 Simultaneously, the empire ranked third as a 
destination for foreign investment.23 However, it was not only the representatives of industry and 
finance trumpeting the value of empire. After the imposition of a French protectorate over 
Morocco in 1912, a segment of the nominally anti-imperialist French Section of the Workers' 
International (SFIO) hoped to reduce unemployment by granting farms to French workers in the 
newly occupied territory.24 So, when the anti-colonial Rif War (1920-26) threatened French 
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hegemony in Morocco, a majority of the SFIO deputies supported military intervention.25 By the 
1920s, even the opponents of imperialism assumed that it benefited European workers and 
restricted their objections to moral arguments.26 
The Great Depression only reinforced popular perceptions of the empire’s economic 
importance. Due to the decline in international trade, the empire surpassed Britain as France’s 
largest trading partner as imperial tariffs assured markets for French manufactured goods.27 By 
1939, over 40% of French exports went to the empire and it accounted for 37% of imports, 
including virtually all of the agricultural imports.28 At the same time, the empire absorbed 
between 40 and 50% of the total value of French long-term investments abroad.29 
After the Second World War, maintaining the empire appeared crucial to reconstruction. 
Jean Monet’s plan for French recovery depended upon the development of primary production in 
the empire to contribute to the balance of payments.30 France was not the only colonial power 
counting on her empire to pay for reconstruction. Belgium obtained from the Congo natural 
resources that facilitated reconstruction without needing to spend foreign currency, imports 
quadrupling from 1939 to 1956.31 Likewise, the Dutch planned to alleviate their shortage of 
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dollars and restore their prewar advantageous balance of trade with the United States through the 
export of natural resources from Indonesia.32 To that end, the Netherlands launched a military 
campaign (1945-49) to regain control of the country after Indonesia’s declaration of 
independence following the surrender of the Japanese. 
However, by the mid-1950s, imperialism was losing its economic rationale, particularly 
as the prices of raw materials subsided after the Korean War. In her study of two conglomerates 
that together accounted for 30% of private investment in French Equatorial Africa and French 
West Africa, Coquery-Vindrovitch (1975) found that the firms enjoyed considerable profits until 
1952 thanks to demand for primary products, but they declined precipitously thereafter.33 
As international demand for primary products declined, all of France’s African colonies 
except for the Ivory Coast faced budget deficits and private investment dried up.34 The primary 
remaining beneficiaries of continued French colonialism were globally uncompetitive firms 
exploiting imperial protectionism.35 However, because the colonies now ran large trade deficits 
with France, large infusions of government aid were required to sustain the market for these 
uncompetitive goods.36 By 1956-63, public aid to French Africa outpaced private investment by 
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a ratio of 2.4-to-1.37 Another way that Paris lessened the colonies’ trade deficit was 
implementing price supports for colonial produce sold in the metropolis.38 
Growing segments of the French bureaucracy and elite opinion perceived the empire as 
an economic burden, subsidizing uncompetitive industries of the past at the expense of 
industrialization.39 The journalist Raymond Cartier popularized this view in a series of articles in 
the widely read right-wing weekly Paris-Match in 1956. After surveying French Africa’s 
underdevelopment, Cartier concluded that the empire was an economic liability and that Paris 
should redirect public investment in Africa towards modernizing France. He observed that 
Switzerland and Sweden flourished without colonies and how Dutch prosperity increased after 
decolonizing Indonesia, which he attributed to the Netherlands ceasing to squander resources on 
attempts to develop colonial backwaters. “[The Netherlands] would not be in the same situation 
today if, instead of modernizing her factories and reclaiming the Zuiderzee, she had to build 
railways in Java, to cover Sumatra with dams, to pay family allowances to the polygamous men 
of Borneo.”40 
Hoping that France might replicate the Netherlands’ success, Cartier insisted that it was 
“necessary to transfer as fast as possible as much responsibility to Africans… at their risk and 
peril.”41 By 1961, Cartierism had become the consensus and De Gaulle could declare, “The least 
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one can say is that Africa costs us more than it benefits us… Our own progress has now become 
our great national ambition and is the real source of our power and influence. It is a fact that 
decolonization is in our own interest and is therefore our policy.”42 
British postwar attitudes toward empire followed a similar trajectory. After the Second 
World War, Britain faced widespread shortages, from food to fuel, while the wartime disruption 
of trade stimulated industrialization overseas that decreased international demand for British 
manufactured goods. The resulting 1947 balance of payments crisis convinced the Attlee 
government to acquire dollars by maximizing colonial raw material exports to the Dollar Zone 
while curbing the dollar expenditure of colonies running trade surpluses with the Dollar Zone.43 
To execute the plan, West Africa and Malaya, formerly imperial backwaters, required a 
suffusion of investment from the British Treasury. By October 1949, Defense Secretary A. V. 
Alexander articulated as one of the government’s three main policy objectives “the most rapid 
development practicable of our overseas possessions, since without such Colonial development 
there can be no major improvement in the standard of living of our own people at home.”44 
Although using the language of development, the plan for redressing Britain’s trade 
imbalance was exploitative in practice. State organizations, such as the West African Produce 
Control Board, purchased export commodities in bulk at prices set by the British government’s 
Ministry of Supply that were far below the international market prices.45 Simultaneously, the 
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Colonial Dollar Drain Committee, comprised of representatives from the Treasury, Colonial 
Office, Board of Trade, and the Bank of England, imposed on each colony a dollar import 
ceiling.46 
These colonial policies enjoyed support across the political spectrum. The scheme 
appealed to British business interests because colonial development increased demand for 
manufactured goods while dollar import ceilings reduced foreign competition.47 At the same 
time, the hard left of the Labour Party believed that the survival of the comprehensive welfare 
state then under construction depended on access to raw materials from the African colonies. The 
1947 pamphlet Keep Left by Labour MPs Michael Foot, Richard Crossman, and Ian Mikardo 
enumerated the policies that the hard left of the Labour Party expected of the Attlee Government. 
We can concentrate our manpower and resources on the African development which 
should be our main colonial responsibility in the next twenty years. Already an 
imaginative beginning has been made under the Labour Government. The development, 
for instance, of a large area in East Africa for the growing of ground nuts should ensure-
that we shall never again be short of fats. Together with France and Belgium, we bear the 
responsibility for the major part of the African Continent. We should make every effort to 
co-operate closely with them in many similar schemes. As well as reducing our 
dependence on the New World for foodstuffs and raw materials… It is not an 
exaggeration to say that the future of European Socialism depends on the success of our 
combined colonial policies in the African Continent.48 
The government was receptive to this message and through the Colonial Development 
Corporation invested in projects intended to produce raw materials and food urgently needed in 
Britain without draining dollar reserves or becoming increasingly reliant on the US. 
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However, these economic rationales for imperialism lost traction in the 1950s. The 
Treasury initially predicted that development aid would promptly spur self-sustained economic 
development. But, by the mid-1950s, the Treasury feared becoming a charity as mushrooming 
colonial populations multiplied development needs. In a 5 July 1956 minute to Secretary of State 
for Colonies Alan Lennox-Boyd, Deputy Under-Secretary of State in charge of the Economic 
Division Sir Hilton Poynton maintained that there was no quick cure for colonial development’s 
growing price tag and suggested that Britain “may have to begin to have a deliberate policy of 
shedding some of our Colonial burdens.”49 
Just when the dividends of colonial development aid were proving to be disappointing, a 
large faction of the Conservative Party embraced monetarism and desired to cut government 
expenditure significantly, even if that entailed higher unemployment and a smaller welfare state. 
Prime Minister Harold Macmillan (1957-63), however, preferred a “One Nation” conservatism 
that prioritized full employment and generous social spending. After all three of his treasury 
ministers resigned in January 1958 in protest of his opposition to their proposed spending cuts, 
Macmillan increasingly regarded decolonization as an alternative source of retrenchment. 
As Chancellor of the Exchequer from 1955 to 1957, Macmillan was privy to the debates 
surrounding the escalating price of colonial development aid. And, eighteen days after 
succeeding Anthony Eden, he commissioned a report “to see something like a profit and loss 
account for each of our Colonial possessions, so that we may be better able to gauge whether, 
from the financial and economic point of view we are likely to gain or to lose by its departure.”50 
                                                 
49Ritchie Ovendale (1995) “Macmillan and the Wind of Change in Africa, 1957-1960,” The Historical Journal, 
38(2) p. 458. 
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The report, delivered by Official Committee on Colonial Policy in September 1957, effectively 
dismissed the empire’s continuing utility, concluding that “the economic considerations tend to 
be evenly matched and the economic interests of the United Kingdom are unlikely in themselves 
to be decisive in determining whether or not a territory should become independent.”51 
Except for a die-hard imperialist fringe, the Conservative Party warmed to decolonization 
as a means of budgetary restraint. This even included the former arch-imperialist Enoch Powell, 
who had been one of the three treasury ministers to resign after Macmillan opposed reigning in 
social spending.52 With a now stable pound, the cost of colonial development appeared to 
outweigh any benefit from the empire’s dollar-earning potential.53 
Just as the utility of European colonialism declined, increasing trade liberalization, from 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade to the European Economic Community, further 
diminished the cost of secession worldwide. As protectionism waned, the economic returns of 
controlling a piece of territory declined,54 thereby reducing the incentive to resist secessionism 
militarily. 
Yet, despite the burgeoning cost of counterinsurgency and imperialism’s waning 
popularity, democracies still occasionally suppress secessionist movements. The exception to the 
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rule occurs when there exists in the territory claimed by the secessionists an enfranchised loyalist 
population that has reason to fear persecution should the secessionists win independence. 
The loyalists who are most likely to fear persecution are those enjoying privileges that are 
not shared by the ethnic/national group represented by the secessionists. For example, thanks to 
gerrymandering, Protestant loyalists in Northern Ireland governed Catholic-majority areas, such 
as Derry, and gave Protestants preferential access to public services and public sector jobs. 
Naturally, the Protestant loyalists feared a role reversal in a united, overwhelmingly Catholic 
Ireland. Likewise, in the West Bank, Jews enjoy preferential access to land and water. And, while 
Jewish settler security offences are generally tried in Israeli civilian courts, Palestinian ones are 
tried before military tribunals with a near 100% conviction rate. Accordingly, the Jewish settlers 
have much to fear if Israel relinquishes control of the West Bank to revenge-minded Palestinians. 
However, there are rare cases of loyalists, including the Hindus in Jammu and Kashmir, who fear 
persecution despite legal equality on account of the secessionists’ religious extremism. 
Wilson’s (1980) theory of the politics of regulation illuminates why democratic 
governments risk costly counterinsurgencies to protect loyalists. According to the theory, the 
likelihood of a policy’s adoption depends on the distribution and magnitude of its costs and 
benefits. When a policy benefits a concentrated group while imposing a moderate per capita cost 
on the rest of society, the beneficiaries have a stronger incentive to organize and lobby 
lawmakers and enjoy a high probability of success. This model of concentrated benefits versus 
diffused costs is used to explain phenomena including: tariffs and quotas that raise prices while 
imposing a deadweight lose on society (Demsetz 1982), patent extensions demanded by 
research-based pharmaceutical firms to the detriment of consumers of prescription medication 
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(Permanand and Mossialos 2005) and agricultural subsidies paid at the expense of taxpayers 
(Carter 2006). 
Likewise, when loyalists’ livelihood depends on continued rule by the metropolis, the 
magnitude of the benefit to them of thwarting secession far exceeds the diffused cost to the 
metropolis’s population of waging an anti-secessionist counterinsurgency. Consequently, if 
loyalists are enfranchised, they mostly become single-issue voters when secessionists threaten 
their privileged status and are able to out organize the peace camp. 
The three hypotheses below encapsulate the theory articulated in this chapter. In the next 
chapter we will test them against the entire population of peaceful secessions and secessionist 
conflicts from 1961-2007. Then, the last chapter will use process tracing in case studies 
representing different configurations of the dependent and independent variables. 
H1 Non-democratic regimes, at least initially, always refuse to accede to secessionists’ 
demands and resort to military force to prevent it. 
H2 The only time that peaceful secession from non-democracies occurs is when 
dictators initiate the separation for their own benefit in the absence of groups 
prepared to fight to achieve independence. 
H3 Democracies permit secession except when there exists in the territory claimed by 
the secessionists an enfranchised loyalist population that has reason to fear 
persecution should the secessionists win independence. 
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CHAPTER 3: DATA AND RESULTS 
To test the hypotheses introduced in the preceding chapter, this dissertation employs crisp 
set qualitative comparative analysis (csQCA) of the entire population of peaceful secessions and 
secessionist conflicts from 1961-2007. This dissertation only includes secessionist conflicts 
active since 1961 to account for the aforementioned increasing cost of suppressing secessionists 
over the course of the twentieth-century, which coincided with the decline in colonies’ value. As 
discussed below, since the Correlates of War Dataset ends in 2007, so does this dissertation’s 
analysis. 
This dissertation requires a methodology that allows for multiple conjunctural causation 
(Ragin 1987). As noted above, distinct paths can lead to a government deciding to suppress 
secessionists. The existence of a loyalist population does not have the same incremental effect 
across all cases. It only affects the calculations of democratic governments. 
The oft-cited limitations of csQCA do not apply to this dissertation’s operationalization 
of its independent variables. The most common objection to csQCA is that its dichotomization of 
essentially continuous variables, like GDP per capita, entails a tremendous simplification of the 
data. Furthermore, where one places the threshold of the dichotomy may alter the results 
(Goldthorpe 1997).  
At first glance, it may seem ill advised to treat regime type as a dichotomous variable 
rather than as a spectrum. Measures of democracy, from Polity IV to Freedom House, use 
numerical scales that gauge constraints on executive power and the protection of civil liberties. 
Moreover, increasing attention is being paid to competitive authoritarian regimes that seemingly 
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obscure the line between democracy and dictatorship by holding elections that fail to meet 
democratic standards due to pervasive corruption among the political elite and the blurring of the 
line between the ruling party and the state (Carothers 2002, Levitsky and Way 2010). 
Nevertheless, democracy is not a continuous variable in this dissertation’s hypotheses 
because the relationship between democracy and a government’s reaction to secessionism is not 
probabilistic, but categorical. We do not expect that as a country becomes more democratic it 
becomes more likely to permit secession. The hypotheses predict that competitive authoritarian 
regimes are just as likely to resist secession forcibly as totalitarian regimes. Similarly, we would 
not expect marginal changes in the protection of civil liberties in consolidated democracies to 
influence a government’s reaction to secessionist activity. Accordingly, csQCA is the appropriate 
method to test the qualitative difference between the reactions of dictatorships and democracies 
to secession. 
The challenge is assigning the minimum thresholds for the presence of the independent 
variables. The dependent variable is dichotomous by nature. A government either employs 
deadly force to quell secession or it does not. But, what represents the dividing line between 
democracy and dictatorship? Similarly, how many loyalists constitute a loyalist population? As 
discussed more fully in the results section below, after running the csQCA twice, first with Polity 
IV data and then with Varieties of Democracy data, we can be more confident that an arbitrary 
dividing line between democracy and dictatorship is not tainting the dissertation’s results.  
Another commonly mentioned weakness of csQCA is atemporality. Sometimes an 
outcome depends on events occurring in a particular order. Yet, csQCA cannot distinguish 
between different sequential paths of causation (Boswell and Brown 1999). However, csQCA’s 
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atemporality is also unproblematic because a government’s reaction to secessionist activity only 
depends on the presence or absence of several conditions and not their order. 
Case Selection 
The dissertation identifies the population of peaceful secessions and secessionist conflicts 
by combining the list of countries that gained independence peacefully between 1961 and 2007 
with the secessionist conflicts mentioned in the Correlates of War Dataset (COW) over the same 
time interval. However, because COW only includes conflicts that caused 1,000 fatalities, this 
dissertation supplements the COW list with all cases of secessionist conflict that caused at least 
200 casualties (killed or wounded). The reason that this dissertation sets a minimum threshold of 
casualties for a case to qualify as a secessionist conflict is to avoid violent secessionist 
movements with miniscule followings, such as white nationalist separatists in the US, from 
swamping the data. National governments rarely even address the secessionist aspirations of 
small, violent cults, considering policing their activists to be a law enforcement matter rather 
than a political issue. 
This dissertation also excludes cases in which secessionist politics remained generally 
peaceful and independence referenda failed (e.g. Quebec in 1980 and 1995). Under such 
circumstances governments need not decide whether to suppress secessionist activity or not. 
COW includes three intrastate conflicts in India: (1) the Naxalite Rebellion of 1970-1971, 
(2) the Indian Golden Temple War of 1984, and (3) the Kashmir Insurgents War of 1990-2005. 
Of these, only the third is unambiguously a case of secessionist conflict. The Naxalite Rebellion, 
which continues to this day on a smaller scale, is a Maoist insurgency aiming to transform India 
into a communist state. Whether to include the Indian Golden Temple War as a case of secession 
is more complicated because the leader of the Sikh militants barricaded in the Golden Temple, 
Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale, did not clearly advocate Sikh independence. While he claimed that 
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the Sikhs were a “distinct nation,” Bhindranwale simultaneously insisted, “We like to live in 
India.”55 
Since the Khalistan movement for an independent Sikh state in Punjab remained marginal 
and primarily a diaspora affair,56 the bloodiest attack being the 23 July 1985 bombing of an Air 
India flight operating on the Toronto–Montreal–London–Delhi route, it is excluded from this 
study’s list of secessionist conflicts. However, unlike COW, the insurgencies in Northeast India 
are included. In the last half-century, more than 50 insurrectionary groups have operated in the 
seven states of Northeast India.57 They can be divided into those demanding secession, a separate 
state within India, and those demanding autonomous district councils.58 In the state of Assam, 
while the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) has fought for Assamese independence, the 
Karbi Longri N.C. Hills Liberation Front (KLNLF) and National Democratic Front of Bodoland 
(NDFB) have each sought to break away from Assam and establish sovereign states for the Karbi 
and Bodo peoples respectively. Since the secessionist conflicts in Northeast India are not 
independent phenomena, rebel groups often fighting each other as well as the Indian Army, and 
the number of government casualties in some of the insurgencies have been very low (e.g. 17 
policemen in the Meghalaya Insurgency between January 2010 and 23 June 201459), this 
dissertation treats all of the secessionist insurrections in Northeast India as a single case. 
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Independent Variables 
The dissertation’s truth table includes five independent variables: (1) regime type 
(democracy or not), (2) whether a dictator initiated secession for his own ends, (3) whether there 
exists a loyalist population in the territory claimed by the secessionists, (4) whether the loyalist 
population has reason to fear persecution should the secessionists win independence, and (5) 
whether the loyalists are enfranchised in the metropolis. Then, the table records whether the 
government permitted secession to occur peacefully or, at least initially, attempted to forestall 
secession by force of arms. 
The dissertation uses Polity IV Individual Country Regime Trends, 1946-2013 to estimate 
which regimes are democratic. Polity IV uses a 21-point scale to map the political spectrum from 
-10 representing hereditary monarchy to +10 signifying a consolidated democracy. Its coding of 
democracy factors in three elements: (1) “the presence of institutions and procedures through 
which citizens can express effective preferences about alternative policies and leaders,” (2) “the 
existence of institutionalized constraints on the exercise of power by the executive,” and (3) “the 
guarantee of civil liberties to all citizens in their daily lives and in acts of political 
participation.”60 
In keeping with Polity IV’s definition, any country with a score of 6 or higher is 
democratic. However, in two cases Polity IV’s score is problematic. First, categorizing Pakistan 
as a democracy in 1973 is indefensible and diverges from the findings of Freedom House and 
Varieties of Democracy (Liberal Democracy Index). Polity IV represents 1973 Pakistan as a 
stable democracy with a score of 8. This is in spite of Pakistani President Zulfikar Ali Bhutto 
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responding to calls from a democratically elected Balochistan government for greater autonomy 
with the mass arrest of two chief ministers, two governors and forty-four legislators. 
Second, Polity IV consistently gives apartheid South Africa score of four. While this low 
score accurately reflects the disenfranchisement of the non-White population, what is relevant in 
this study is whether loyalists have a voice in the metropolis’s political system. Since there was a 
largely free multiparty democracy for white South Africans, including the loyalists in the 
mandate territory of South West Africa, this dissertation classifies apartheid South Africa as a 
democracy. 
Despite Polity IV’s shortcomings, this dissertation cannot use Freedom House because it 
only goes back to 1972. Varieties of Democracy’s Liberal Democracy Index is missing data from 
Oman before 2000, preventing us from classifying Oman’s regime type during the Dhofar 
Rebellion (1962-76). However, this dissertation does use the Liberal Democracy Index to check 
the robustness of the rest of the results. 
One knows that dictator-initiated secession has transpired when a non-democratic 
government grants independence to a territory in the absence of groups threatening violence 
unless granted sovereignty over the land in question. If secessionists are unwilling to eject 
violently the security forces of the metropolis, the government may simply ignore their demands. 
So, if a non-democracy, or for that matter any country, relinquishes control of a territory 
uncoerced, you have a case of secession from above. 
This dissertation identifies someone as a loyalist if he meets either of the following 
criteria: (1) He voted in a referendum against secession. (2) In the absence of a referendum or if 
loyalists boycotted it, he belongs to either the ethnic/national group that controls the country’s 
government (e.g. Portuguese in Angola) or to a group that overwhelmingly identifies politically 
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with the government (e.g. the Jews in French Algeria, who, unlike most of the Algerian Arabs, 
enjoyed French citizenship). Although referenda on independence provide the clearest evidence 
of the presence of loyalists, they are quite rare. Of the 101 cases of secessionist activity surveyed 
in this dissertation, only 14 involved a referendum and loyalists boycotted four of them. 
Consequently, this dissertation relies primarily on the second criterion to identify loyalists. 
The next question that arises is how many loyalists are necessary to affect government 
policy. Because democracies aggregate voter preferences differently, it is impossible to calculate 
a precise minimum number of loyalists necessary to prevail upon a national government to 
oppose secession militarily. As discussed below in the Palestine case study, the Israeli settlers, 
despite constituting less than 2.5 percent of the population, handed the pro-settlement Likud 
Party victory in the 1981 parliamentary elections, thereby guaranteeing continued Israeli control 
over all of the Palestinian territories. 
Although Spruyt thinks that coalition governments in parliamentary systems are more 
likely to cater to niche interests, majoritarian presidential systems that encourage candidates to 
court a small population of undecided voters could also be hijacked by a lobby that positions 
itself between the two major parties. Since loyalists are geographically concentrated, they 
actually benefit from first-past-the-post voting in territorially defined electoral districts. The 
payment of agricultural subsidies in the US highlights the political influence of geographically 
concentrated groups. The US Department of Agriculture spent more than $25 billion in 2016 on 
agricultural subsidies to about 1 million farmers, less than one-third of one percent of the 
American population. The farmers’ tremendous political clout flows in large part from their 
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overrepresentation in the US legislature because of their geographic concentration in a number of 
disproportionately agricultural states.61 
So, in both proportional and majoritarian systems it appears that the threshold of single-
issue voters required to sway policy is quite low. Accordingly, where a referendum is held, this 
dissertation identifies a loyalist population when the anti-secessionist vote equals one percent or 
more of the entire metropolis’s electorate. Elsewhere, a loyalist population is recognized when 
the number of people from the ethnic/national group governing the metropolis who reside in the 
territory claimed by the secessionists equals at least one percent of the metropolis’s enfranchised 
population. The enfranchised population is usually the entire population, but in Apartheid South 
Africa it only included the whites. Accordingly, this dissertation identifies a loyalist population 
in South West Africa because the population of whites in the territory exceeded one percent of 
the white population of South Africa. To determine the population of the metropolis and the 
demographics of the territory claimed by the secessionists, this dissertation relies on government 
census data and population statistics in anthropological studies. 
In choosing a proxy for loyalists fearing persecution after secession, this dissertation 
maintains that the loyalists who are most likely to feel threatened by secession are those who 
stand to lose institutionalized privileges. After secession eliminates their preferential access to 
resources, the formerly privileged group is likely to face calls for redistribution. For example, the 
whites in British colonies in sub-Saharan Africa enjoyed preferential access to arable land. 
However, after independence, not only did the colonists in Kenya and Rhodesia lose this 
preferential access, they faced an extensive policy of farm expropriation. 
                                                 
61Chris Edwards (2016) “Agricultural Subsidies,” Downsizing the Federal Government: Your Guide to Cutting 
Federal Spending. https://www.downsizinggovernment.org/agriculture/subsidies 
 46 
Furthermore, because institutionalized discrimination generates animosity against the 
legally privileged group, secession can spell not only the expropriation of the group’s assets, but 
their ethnic cleansing. Just weeks after Brussels granted independence to the Congo, an orgy of 
violence directed against the formerly legally privileged Belgian population prompted its mass 
exodus. Likewise, the 1962 Oran Massacre in French Algeria convinced most remaining Pied-
Noirs to flee. After the Portuguese military withdrew from Angola and Mozambique, more than 
500,000 Portuguese colonists became refugees. Today, the Palestinian Authority usually insists 
that all Israelis must evacuate their territory upon independence.62 
This dissertation identifies loyalists as enjoying institutionalized privileges if any of the 
following three conditions apply: (1) Privileged access to land is enshrined in law. (2) Only the 
loyalists can vote in metropolitan elections. (3) The metropolis empowers the loyalist group to 
allocate spending on public services and hire public employees inequitably in their own favor. 
Determining whether any of the conditions of institutionalized privilege apply is relatively easy 
because of the absence of gray cases. 
Between 1961 and 2007, there have been only twelve instances of democracies facing 
secessionists claiming territories inhabited by loyalists. In three cases, the loyalists and the group 
represented by the secessionists enjoyed absolute political equality. The first case is Quebec, 
where the Anglophone Canadians enjoyed none of the privileges enumerated above at the time of 
the two failed independence referenda (1980, 1995). When Nevis held an unsuccessful 
independence referendum in 1998, the political divisions were not ethno-national, but revolved 
around how recent St. Kitts and Nevis federal legislation might effect the island’s offshore 
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financial sector.63 Montenegrins in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia likewise enjoyed de jure 
and de facto equality with their Serbian compatriots. The pro-secession camp persuaded 55.5% 
of voters to support independence in a 2006 referendum by arguing that Montenegro’s chances 
of entering the EU would improve after severing ties with Belgrade because the Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia was at the time still accusing Serbia of harboring war 
criminals.64 
In every other case, undisguised discriminatory regimes prevailed. The least oppressive 
was Protestant-run Northern Ireland, where a combination of gerrymandering and a property-
based franchise for local elections ensured Protestants governed even Catholic-majority cities 
such as Derry and used their political dominance to give Protestants preferential treatment in the 
hiring of public employees as well as in the provision of public housing.  
Results 
Confirming the first hypothesis entails demonstrating that non-democratic governments, 
at least initially, always meet demands for secession with violence, regardless of the presence of 
loyalists or their political status (see Table 1). While Scenarios VI, VII, and IX display consistent 
support for the hypothesis, Scenario X does not. There is one case (Macedonia seceding from 
Yugoslavia) of a non-democratic government conceding to secessionists’ demands without first 
resorting to military force. The case appears less anomalous when we recall that Macedonia’s 
peaceful separation coincided with Belgrade’s bloody effort to forestall Croatian and Bosnian 
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independence and then, as a last resort, to lob off the Serbian-inhabited regions in those seceding 
republics. So, Yugoslavia’s acceptance of Macedonian secession appears less aberrant and more 
like the reaction of an authoritarian state being forced to prioritize which secessionist movements 
to quash because it possessed limited resources. Accordingly, it seems unwarranted to reject the 
first hypothesis on account of this single deviant case. 
Table 1 
 
Polity IV 
Scenario Democracy 
Dictatorship-
initiated 
secession 
Loyalist 
population 
Loyalists 
fear 
persecution 
(enjoy 
privileges) 
Loyalists 
enfranchised 
# of 
cases 
Expectation: 
Government 
permits 
secession Consistency 
         
I Yes No Yes Yes Yes 6 No 1.00 
II Yes No Yes Yes No 3 Yes 1.00 
III Yes No Yes No Yes 2 Yes 1.00 
IV Yes No Yes No No 0 Yes N/A 
V Yes No No No No 49 Yes 0.96 
VI No No Yes Yes Yes 7 No 1.00 
VII No No Yes Yes No 5 No 1.00 
VIII No No Yes No Yes 0 N/A N/A 
IX No No Yes No No 6 No 1.00 
X No No No No No 23 No 0.96 
XI No Yes Yes Yes Yes 0 N/A N/A 
XII No Yes Yes Yes No 1 Yes 1.00 
XIII No Yes Yes No Yes 0 N/A N/A 
XIV No Yes Yes No No 0 N/A N/A 
XV No Yes No No No 1 Yes 1.00 
         
 
Scenarios XII and XV confirm the second hypothesis. While there were no loyalists in 
Spanish Guinea, the Yeltsin government in the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic 
encouraged the dissolution of the Soviet Union through the secession of its other republics 
despite the presence of 25 million Russian loyalists within their borders. These Russians, who 
previously filled most the best jobs, quickly encountered affirmative action hiring schemes 
designed to replace them with members of the republics’ indigenous majorities.65 So, even 
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though dictators expelling territories from their domain is a rare occurrence, the limited data 
suggests that the presence of loyalists does not effect their decision. To better grasp this 
uncommon phenomenon, this dissertation’s case study section includes a chapter on the Spanish 
Guinean and Soviet episodes. 
The evidence supporting the third hypothesis is even more compelling. Six cases exist of 
democracies facing secessionists claiming territory containing an enfranchised loyalist 
population that has reason to fear persecution should the secessionists win independence. As 
expected, in each case the democratic government resorted to force to forestall secession. Among 
the 54 other cases of democracies facing secessionists, in only two, each involving India, did the 
government resort to force. However, as illuminated in the case study section below, India 
occupies the interstice between consolidated democracy and the milder autocracies, its illiberal 
democracy characterized by political leaders habitually promoting extrajudicial violence. 
The 52 cases of democracies permitting secession to occur peacefully includes 47 
examples without any loyalists, two with enfranchised loyalists not fearing persecution at the 
secessionists’ hands, and – most importantly – three cases of disenfranchised loyalists fearing 
persecution at the secessionists’ hands. Some might claim that it is impossible to reach a 
conclusion from so few cases regarding the impact of loyalists’ enfranchisement and fear of 
persecution on democracies’ reaction to secessionist activity. However, causal process tracing via 
case study analysis of the scenarios mentioned above should reduce doubts raised by the paucity 
of cases. 
Robustness Checks 
To assess the robustness of the results, the dissertation reran the csQCA using the 
Varieties of Democracy, Liberal Democracy Index (VoD-LDI). Varieties of Democracy defines 
“liberal democracy” as a regime that “protect[s] individual and minority rights against the 
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tyranny of the state and the tyranny of the majority.”66 The index gauges the quality of liberal 
democracy by measuring the constitutional protection of civil liberties, rule of law, judicial 
independence, and checks and balances that limit the exercise of executive power.67 The VoD-
LDI rates liberal democracy on a scale from 0 to 1. Unlike many metrics of democracy, the VoD-
LDI does not divide the scale into categories (e.g. Democracy, Anocracy, and Autocracy in Polity 
IV and Free, Partly Free, and Not Free in Freedom House). This dissertation recognizes 0.5 as the 
minimum threshold of democracy because it closely correlates with Freedom House’s distinction 
between free and partly free regimes. 
There are only two differences between the Polity IV results and those generated from 
using VoD-LDI. First, while Polity IV classifies Turkey and Sri Lanka as democracies in 1984 
and 2002 respectively, they do not meet the VoD-LDI 0.5 minimum threshold. Accordingly, 
those two cases move from Scenario I to Scenario VI (see Table 2). However, since dictatorships 
are expected to respond the same way to secessionists as democracies confronting secessionists 
claiming territories containing enfranchised loyalists fearing persecution, the VoD-LDI results 
effectively replicate those based on Polity IV. The second difference is that the Dhofar Rebellion 
(1962-76) is no longer included as a case in Scenario X because VoD-LDI lacks data from Oman 
before 2000. 
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Table 2 
 
Varieties of Democracy, Liberal Democracy Index 
Scenario Democracy 
Dictatorship-
initiated 
secession 
Loyalist 
population 
Loyalists 
fear 
persecution 
(enjoy 
privileges) 
Loyalists 
enfranchised 
# of 
cases 
Expectation: 
Government 
permits 
secession Consistency 
         
I Yes No Yes Yes Yes 4 No 1.00 
II Yes No Yes Yes No 3 Yes 1.00 
III Yes No Yes No Yes 2 Yes 1.00 
IV Yes No Yes No No 0 Yes N/A 
V Yes No No No No 49 Yes 0.96 
VI No No Yes Yes Yes 9 No 1.00 
VII No No Yes Yes No 5 No 1.00 
VIII No No Yes No Yes 0 N/A N/A 
IX No No Yes No No 6 No 1.00 
X No No No No No 22 No 0.95 
XI No Yes Yes Yes Yes 0 N/A N/A 
XII No Yes Yes Yes No 1 Yes 1.00 
XIII No Yes Yes No Yes 0 N/A N/A 
XIV No Yes Yes No No 0 N/A N/A 
XV No Yes No No No 1 Yes 1.00 
         
 
Case Study Selection 
Peters (1998) compares two approaches to case study selection, choosing cases that are 
the “most similar” versus those that are the “most different.” The most similar approach involves 
picking cases that are as similar as possible in order to control for concomitant variation while 
the most different approach seeks to explain why cases that are so dissimilar yield the same 
outcome. This study employs both techniques. It compares two of the most similar cases of 
settler colonialism, French Algeria and the British colonies in East and Central Africa. The 
comparison isolates loyalist enfranchisement as the outstanding distinction between them, 
thereby confirming the hypothesis that the enfranchisement of the French settlers explains why 
Paris responded militarily to Algerian secessionist demands while Westminster decolonized 
Kenya and the Central African Federation peacefully. This dissertation utilizes the most similar 
test again by comparing Britain’s peaceful decolonization of Kenya and the Central African 
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Federation with the Troubles in Northern Ireland, again finding that loyalist enfranchisement 
accounts for the divergent outcomes. 
Then, in an attempt to demonstrate that this dissertation’s hypotheses apply globally and 
not only to Western European countries, the most different method is used by comparing the 
French and British experiences in Algeria and Ireland respectively with Israel’s occupation and 
settlement of the Palestinian territories. Despite differences in time, region, and religion, the one 
factor that seems to unite the three aforementioned cases and contribute to the common outcome 
of repressing secession is the existence of an enfranchised loyalist population fearing persecution 
at the hands of the secessionists. 
There are also several of what Gerring (2008) calls “influential cases,” where “the analyst 
attempts to provide a rationale for disregarding a problematic case or set of problematic cases. 
That is to say, she attempts to show why apparent deviations from the norm are not really 
deviant, or do not challenge the core of the theory.”68 From this dissertation’s first hypothesis, 
that dictatorships at least initially always oppose secessionists violently to deter potential 
revolutionaries and putschists, one would not have expected Francisco Franco to decolonize 
Spanish Guinea peacefully or the Soviet Union’s peaceful dissolution. Process tracing in the case 
studies below reveals that the aforesaid cases do not conflict with the first hypothesis because the 
dictators initiated the secession for their own benefit and thus were not seen as placating 
secessionist groups. This dissertation created an extra independent variable to capture these two 
cases. 
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More challenging is the case of India, often touted as the “largest democracy in the 
world.” Yet, New Delhi has consistently rejected all demands for secession, from Kashmir to 
those in the Seven Sister States of Northeast India. Closer analysis indicates that despite holding 
relatively free elections at the Union level, throughout most of India’s history, it has occupied an 
interstice between the consolidated democracies and bureaucratic authoritarian regimes. Due to 
the long tradition of local and national Indian politicians sanctioning and directing violence, an 
Indian Prime Minister who permitted secession would likely be perceived as weak and face a 
leadership challenge. 
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CHAPTER 4: CASE STUDIES 
French Algeria 
France’s 132-year presence in Algeria commenced in 1830 when King Charles X 
wagered that a military triumph would improve his domestic political position and Algiers was 
the obvious target. During the French Revolutionary Wars, Paris contracted to purchase wheat 
for the army from two Algerian Jewish merchants. Those merchants were in turn in debt to the 
Dey of Algiers and fell into arrears when the restored French monarchy neglected to pay them. 
The Dey of Algiers summoned the French consul and struck him with his flywhisk when 
promises of repayment were not forthcoming, thereby provoking an ineffective French blockade. 
So, when Charles X sought a war to distract the French population from his growing 
unpopularity, Algiers was a natural candidate. 
The invasion began on June 14 and French troops entered Algiers three weeks later. 
Although conceived merely as a political ploy, the occupation of Algiers spawned a settler 
(colon) regime built on the expropriation of the most fruitful Algerian land and the political 
subjugation of the indigenous population. Even as the cost of maintaining this regime became 
apparent in Paris, the colons’ representatives in successive French legislatures repeatedly stymied 
efforts to reform the discriminatory settler regime, let alone dismantle it. 
The expropriation of Algerian assets started even before Paris decided whether to annex 
its conquest. When the Dey’s regency collapsed, thousands of Algerines fled or were exiled, 
leaving behind all the property they could not carry. Paris hastily issued a decree in September 
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1830 to sequester the abandoned property and auction it off to European speculators.69 The 
French employed numerous methods of extending European land ownership in Algeria, the 
following being only a partial list. 
1. Confiscating the lands inhabited by rebellious tribes70 
2. Appropriating habous (i.e. property administered by Islamic religious authorities for 
charitable purposes)71 
3. Expropriating all beylik (i.e. state land – At the time of its expropriation, a majority of 
the beylik land was “assigned to tribes or individuals in return for services or under 
various hereditary usufructuary tenures.”72) 
4. Nationalizing Algeria’s forests while reserving only small areas for indigenous use73 
5. Seizing collectively-owned tribal land on the pretext that it was not being 
productively used (Often, colons rented at exorbitant rates the purportedly 
unproductive lands back to the Algerians that worked them.)74 
The colons early recognized the benefits of representative government. France annexed 
the occupied regions of Algeria in 1834 and installed a military government headed by a 
governor general responsible to the Ministry of War. In 1844, following the defeat of Abdelkader 
El Djezairi’s prolonged insurgency, Governor General Thomas-Robert Bugeaud established the 
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Arab Bureau, a cadre of Arabic-speaking specialists charged with facilitating Algeria’s 
administration. Hoping to avert future rebellions, the Bureau deputized native notables to collect 
taxes, dispense justice, and maintain order among the indigenous Algerians. In return, the 
military government protected their proxies’ property.75 
Colon opinion increasingly identified military rule, and especially the Arab Bureau, as a 
check on the despoliation of Algerian resources and demanded the colony’s assimilation into 
Metropolitan France.76 Accordingly, the colons embraced the 1848 February Revolution that 
ushered in the French Second Republic, which promptly declared Algeria to be French territory 
and divided it into three departements. Although the colons could not yet vote in French national 
elections, Paris replaced direct military rule with elected municipal councils and mayors.77 Only 
the colons could vote and were entitled to two-thirds of the seats of each council, the rest being 
appointed Algerians. Native Algerians were ineligible to serve as mayors or assistant mayors.78 
However, the colons’ political dominance in Algeria only lasted as long as French democracy. 
Louis-Napoleon Bonaparte launched a coup d’état in 1851 and the following year 
engineered a referendum that established the Second French Empire with the now Napoleon III 
as emperor. Napoleon III regarded Algeria as a pivotal asset that provided a bulwark against 
British and Ottoman influence in the region. Recognizing that Arabs would always constitute an 
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overwhelming majority of the population, he restored military control in 1860 to limit land 
expropriation by the colons that he feared could jeopardize France’s hold on the country. 79 
To reconcile indigenous Algerians to French rule, he championed the Senatus consulte of 
22 April 1863, which recognized tribal ownership of land that had not been expropriated 
theretofore. The bill mandated determining which land belonged to which tribe and subsequently 
established councils to administer the territory of the tribes’ constituent duwars (clans). Lastly, 
over a period of between one and three generations, the duwars’ members would subdivide the 
land and only then would it be legally transferrable.80 The Senatus consulte of 14 July 1865 
aimed to heighten Algerian attachment to France by declaring them French nationals, thereby 
granting them the protection of French law while entitling them to serve in the military and civil 
service.81 However, contrary to Napoleon III’s intentions, the law uniquely entrenched colon 
privilege because Muslim Algerians remained subject to the Shariah in civil matters and the law 
conditioned French citizenship on repudiating Islamic law and agreeing to live under French 
civil law. Viewing such repudiation as apostasy, only 2,500 Algerians acquired French 
citizenship by 1936.82 Nevertheless, the colons perceived Napoleon III as a threat to their 
hegemony and celebrated the proclamation of the French Third Republic in 1870. 
When the Prussians captured Napoleon III, colons expelled the governor general and won 
the sympathy of the leaders of the Third Republic. Even before the Franco-Prussian war ended, 
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the new regime issued decrees restoring civilian rule and granting the Algerian departements 
representation in the French National Assembly and Senate. The second decree generated a 
legislative lobby that would largely dictate French policy in Algeria until the collapse of the 
French Fourth Republic in 1958. 
The Third Republic lost no time in patronizing the colons. It officially abolished the Arab 
Bureau on 24 December 1870 and then accelerated the policy of land expropriation. While 
250,000 hectares of land were distributed to the colons between 1851 and 1860, Napoleon III’s 
conciliatory policies reduced that number to 116,000 between 1861 and 1870. However, between 
1871 and 1880, the number rose to 401,000.83 In addition to seizing 446,000 hectares in 
retaliation for the 1871-72 Kabyle Revolt, the National Assembly repealed key elements of the 
1863 Senatus consulte. The 1873 Warnier Law expedited the transfer of title of collectively-
owned tribal lands to Algerian families with the intention of fragmenting them into unviably 
small plots ripe for purchase by colons.84 It additionally stipulated that all unproductive and 
uncultivated lands had to be surrendered to the French Office of Colonization, which thereby 
acquired 300,000 hectares of arable land.85 Ultimately, from 1877 to 1920, the indigenous 
Algerians lost 1,750,000 hectares.86 And, even though the expropriation of land reduced the 
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Algerian population to penury, for much of the French occupation they paid a majority of the 
taxes that financed the construction of the infrastructure that made colon plantations profitable.87 
The reason that the colons succeeded in achieving most of their political aims after 1870 
despite fierce Algerian resistance and the costs that it imposed on France is their parliamentary 
representation in Paris. This representation was particularly effective due to the low turnover of 
colon delegates to the National Assembly, seniority enabling them to reach the highest levels of 
French government. Eugène Étienne, a deputy for Oran between 1881 and 1919, served as Vice-
President of the Assembly, Minister of the Interior, and Minister of War. Gaston Thomson 
represented Constantine in the National Assembly for more than half-a-century and was Minister 
of Commerce, Industry, Posts and Telegraphs before becoming Minister of the Navy. 
The colon lobby in the National Assembly obstructed even token challenges to their 
hegemony in Algeria. Since the power to tax is the power to destroy, they secured in 1900 a 
budgetary autonomy enjoyed by no other region of France. The governor-general submitted a 
budget for approval to elected assemblies, called the “Financial Delegations,” whose rules of 
membership restricted indigenous Algerians to one-third.88 When the left-wing Popular Front 
achieved power in France in 1936, it sought to co-opt the Algerian elite by granting them 
suffrage. The Blum-Viollette bill identified nine groups of Algerian Arabs that would become 
eligible to vote, some examples being those with diplomas of higher education, officers in the 
Army, and Legion of Honor winners. Even though the bill would have enfranchised only about 
25,000 Algerians, the colon lobby ensured that the bill was not even debated.89 
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Colon influence on Algeria policy continued throughout most of the Fourth Republic and 
ensured that France resorted to military force when the National Liberation Front (FLN) 
launched the Algerian War of Independence in 1954. This influence was attributable to the 
infiltration of French political parties, particularly the Radicals. Even as part of the broader 
coalition of the Rally of the Republican Lefts, the Radical Party remained small, never being one 
of the three biggest parties in the National Assembly. Nevertheless, they were represented, at 
least initially, in every government of the Fourth Republic after 1947.90 Henri Borgeaud, a 
Radical Senator from Algiers, commanded thirty votes in the National Assembly, which was 
often enough to provoke a ministerial crisis.91 So, when the Algerian War of Independence 
erupted on 1 November 1954, the Socialist interior minister Francois Mitterrand took a hard line, 
proclaiming, “Algeria is France” and that “the only possible negotiation is war.” In light of his 
reformist attitude toward Algeria and impatience with the colon lobby, particularly Henri 
Borgeaud, it is clear that “Mitterrand’s rhetoric was aimed at reassuring the Algerian deputies 
whose votes were so vital” to preserving the Mendès France government.92 
Prime Minister Pierre Mendès France (1954-55) presided over the decolonization of 
French Indochina and opened negotiations on independence with nationalist leaders in Tunisia 
and Morocco. Yet, his effort to pacify Algerian nationalists at the colons’ expense in order to 
defuse the worsening violence of the Algerian War of Independence triggered his downfall. 
Although a Radical himself, Mendès France opposed the vote-rigging that vitiated the 1947 
Statute of Algeria.  
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In 1947, Paris created a 120-member Algerian Assembly that gave Europeans and native 
Algerians equal representation. An electoral college comprising 532,000 primarily European 
electors elected 60 members while a second college of over 1.3 million Algerians chose the other 
60. The statute also authorized each college to elect 15 delegates to the French National 
Assembly. However, when Messali Hadj’s pro-independence MTLD won a third of the seats and 
virtually the whole second-college vote in the major towns in the October 1947 municipal 
elections, the spooked governor general and administration decided to rig future Algerian 
elections to ensure that Algerian nationalists remained a small minority in both the Algerian 
Assembly and the Algerian delegation to the National Assembly.93 When Mendès France 
advocated fairly implementing the 1947 Statue to dampen pro-independence sentiment, he faced 
a rebellion in the Radical Party. René Mayer, a Radical deputy to the National Assembly for 
Constantine, Algeria and a past Prime Minister, led the charge against him, which culminated in 
the 5 February 1955 vote of no confidence in the Mendès-France government.94 
The colons had good reason to fear the indigenous Arabs’ empowerment and especially 
Algerian independence. First, there was the threat of expropriation. By 1954, Europeans owned 
2.7 million hectares of the country’s most fertile land95 and since the 1930s Algerian nationalists 
were clamoring for its redistribution to Arab peasants.96 And second, the colons feared being 
massacred if the French military withdrew. 
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A siege mentality existed, particularly in the outlying areas, where vandalism, assaults, 
and even murder were commonplace.97 The colons’ dependence on Paris for protection was 
highlighted by uprisings and massacres requiring French military assistance to suppress. Before 
their defeat, the insurgents during the 1871-72 Kabyle Revolt murdered over 2,000 colons.98 
Then, in April 1901, French troops had to relieve the village of Margueritte Bourgade from 
Righa tribesmen who had forced the European residents to convert to Islam and killed five who 
refused.99 Particularly gruesome was the Sétif massacre of May 1945, during which Algerians 
murdered 103 colons and subjected their corpses to horrific mutilation while women were 
raped.100 The carnage lasted for five days until the military could quell it. So, when the outbreak 
of the Algerian War of Independence was accompanied by widespread FLN graffiti threatening 
the Europeans that their fate was “the suitcase or the coffin,” the colon lobby in the National 
Assembly was uninterested in Mendès France’s proposed reforms and insisted on an 
uncompromising war to prevent Algeria’s secession. 
The Palestinian Territories 
The phenomenon of loyalists exploiting their representation in national parliaments to 
prevent secession is not unique to colonies. Israel’s settlers in East Jerusalem and the West Bank 
(hereafter: Territories) have repeatedly used their electoral clout to impede the creation of a 
Palestinian state. This study focuses exclusively on the settlement of East Jerusalem and the West 
                                                 
97Evans, p. 32. 
98Sung Choi, (2016) “French Algeria, 1830-1962,” in Edward Cavanagh and Lorenzo Veracini. ed.s, The Routledge 
Handbook of Settler Colonialism. London: Routledge. p. 210.  
99Evans, pp. 32-33. 
100Andrew Hussey (2014) The French Intifada: The Long War Between France and Its Arabs. New York: Faber and 
Faber. p. 154. 
 63 
Bank because the settlers in the other territories conquered by Israel (the Sinai Peninsula, Gaza 
Strip, and Golan Heights) were too few in number to affect policy.101  
The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict did not start as a secessionist one. From 1920 until 1948 
it was a sectarian conflict within the British Mandate of Palestine between Zionist groups aiming 
to establish a Jewish state in part or all of the Mandate’s territory and Arab nationalists 
demanding sovereignty over all of Palestine. Then, after Israel’s founding in 1948, the conflict 
transformed into an armed struggle by various Palestinian groups, with the support of 
neighboring Arab countries, to replace Israel with an Arab state. By the early 1960s, Gamal 
Abdel Nasser, the Egyptian President and preponderant political figure in the Arab world, sought 
to consolidate the disparate Palestinian factions into an umbrella group under Egyptian influence. 
At its first summit (13-16 January 1964) the Arab League commissioned Ahmad 
Shukeiri, a former assistant Secretary General of the League, to establish an organization with 
representative institutions to reconstitute the scattered Palestinians as a national unit.102 In May, 
Shukeiri convened a conference in Jordanian-controlled East Jerusalem that proclaimed itself the 
Palestinian National Council (PNC). This body formed the Palestine Liberation Organization 
(PLO) with the Executive Committee of the PNC at its head. After the 1967 Six Day War, 
Palestinian militant groups such as Fatah and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, 
along with its many offshoots, joined the PLO and pushed it in a more confrontational direction. 
The PLO’s 1968 Charter declared all of the former British Mandate of Palestine an indivisible 
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territorial unit to be liberated through armed struggle. And, in 1969, Yasser Arafat, the leader of 
the largest militant group, Fatah, became the chairman of the PLO. The group shed its 
subservience to Egypt and was unanimously recognized as the “sole legitimate representative of 
the Palestinian people” at the 1974 Arab League Summit in Rabat. 
The conflict only began to morph into a secessionist one in 1988 when Arafat demanded 
in a December 13 speech before the UN General Assembly “Israel’s withdrawal from all the 
Palestinian and Arab territories it occupied in 1967, including Arab Jerusalem; the establishment 
of the Palestinian state; the annulment of all expropriation and annexation measures; and the 
dismantling of the settlements established by Israel in the Palestinian and Arab territories since 
1967.”103 For the next five years the PLO remained vague as to whether an Israeli withdrawal 
from the Territories alone would satisfy Palestinian demands for self-determination. That 
question was finally answered unambiguously and affirmatively in the 9 September 1993 Israel-
PLO Letters of Mutual Recognition, which served as the preamble to the Oslo I Accord. Arafat’s 
letter to Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin recognized Israel within the pre-1967 borders, 
thereby transforming the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, at least as far as the PLO was concerned, 
into a secessionist one. 
Israel came into possession of the Territories in the Six Day War. After the 1963 Ba’ath 
Party Coup, Syria became Israel’s most belligerent neighbor, seeking to divert the Banias River 
to block the supply of water to the Sea of Galilee and inviting Fatah guerillas to establish bases 
on their territory.104 Syria’s diversion project would have rendered Israel’s newly constructed 
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National Water Carrier useless and provoked repeated Israeli air raids to demolish it.105 Fatah 
guerilla attacks similarly prompted Israeli retaliatory raids of escalating ferocity against Syria 
and the Jordanian-controlled West Bank, through which most militants entered Israel, even 
though Amman tried to stem the flow of Syrian-based fighters. To deter further Israeli incursions, 
Damascus signed a mutual defense pact with Egypt on 7 November 1966. 
Egypt’s passivity in the face of increasingly deadly Israeli confrontations with Jordan and 
Syria frustrated Nasser’s pretensions to lead the Arab World. On 13 November 1966, two days 
after a mine attack killed three Israeli paratroopers, Israel launched a raid against the West Bank 
village of As Samu that killed fourteen Jordanian soldiers and four civilians.106 Although the 
saboteurs originated from Syria, the Israeli Prime Minister Levi Eshkol argued that “no country 
where the saboteurs find shelter and through whose territory they pass on their way to Israel can 
be exempt from responsibility.”107 The Jordanian state-directed media mocked Nasser for failing 
to come to Jordan’s aid and “hiding behind UNEF’s skirts.”108 
The UN established the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) to supervise the 
cessation of hostilities and withdrawal of foreign forces from the Sinai Peninsula after the 1956 
Suez War. UNEF personnel remained in Sinai long after the war, serving as an informal buffer 
between the Egyptian and Israeli militaries. Nasser faced heavy criticism again in Arab media 
when Egypt rendered no assistance to Syria, despite their mutual defense pact, during an Israeli-
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Syrian air battle on 7 April 1967 in which Syria lost six MiGs.109 So, when the Soviets provided 
Cairo with inaccurate reports of Israeli plans to invade Syria, Nasser decided to deploy Egyptian 
forces in the Sinai, ultimately expelled the UNEF, and closed the Straits of Tiran to Israeli 
shipping. 
On 30 May 1967, Jordan signed a mutual defense treaty with Egypt, which dispatched 
two battalions of commandos to Jordan four days later. The next day an Iraqi mechanized 
brigade also entered Jordan. This display of unity electrified the Arab masses, whipped into a war 
frenzy by radio announcements of Israel’s impending demise. Nasser told a press conference, 
“We will not accept any possibility of coexistence with Israel.”110 Iraq’s president was even more 
direct, stating that “the existence of Israel is an error which must be rectified. This is an 
opportunity to wipe out the ignominy which has been with us since 1948. Our goal is clear – to 
wipe Israel off the map.”111 The Syrian defense minister, Hafez al-Assad, echoed the sentiment, 
expressing that “the time has come to enter into a battle of annihilation.”112 Beleaguered, Israel 
attacked preemptively, destroying three-quarters of Egypt’s air force, all of Jordan’s, and half of 
Syria’s on the first day. During the war, Israel conquered the Sinai Peninsula, Gaza Strip, East 
Jerusalem, the West Bank, and the Golan Heights. Although Israel’s prewar planning focused on 
Egypt, the ad hoc conquest of East Jerusalem and the West Bank proved the most fateful, as 
successive governments facilitated the mass settlement of these territories by Israeli civilians. 
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After the Six Day War, Israel applied its law to East Jerusalem, although it diplomatically 
avoided the word “annexation.” The Arabs of East Jerusalem could either apply for Israeli 
citizenship or accept permanent residency status. Only a small minority embraced the former 
option because it required an oath of loyalty to the state. Permanent residency entitles one to 
“municipal public services as well as to all social benefits provided by the Israeli National 
Insurance Institute (such as healthcare, education and social assistance).”113 They also enjoy the 
right to work in Israel without a special permit and to vote in municipal, but not national, 
elections. 
However, these putative rights mask systematic discrimination. Although Palestinians 
constitute about a third of the city’s population, in recent years the percentage of the municipal 
budget invested in Arab neighborhoods has averaged between 10 and 15 percent. And, from the 
1970s through the 1990s, the allocation never exceeded 5 percent.114 Consequently, most Arab 
neighborhoods lack paved roads, sidewalks, public street lighting, sewage and water supply 
systems.115 
Discriminatory zoning laws have led to a Palestinian housing crisis in East Jerusalem. 
Since 52 percent of East Jerusalem is unavailable for development and 35 percent is reserved for 
Jewish settlements, Palestinians are confined to just 13 percent of the East Jerusalem,116 despite 
representing 57 percent of its population in 2008.117 That 13 percent has always been very 
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densely populated and not a single new Arab neighborhood has been constructed in East 
Jerusalem since 1967. Simultaneously, the Israeli government expropriated a third of the land in 
East Jerusalem from its Palestinian owners to establish and expand Jewish neighborhoods.118  
The regime constructed in the West Bank was even more discriminatory. Immediately 
after conquering the West Bank, the Israeli government imposed military rule, the military 
commander assuming all powers of governance, legislation, appointment, and administration 
over the territory and its residents.119 However, as Israeli civilians settled the Territories, the 
Knesset applied Israeli law to the settlers on a personal and extraterritorial basis while the 
Palestinians remained subject to military rule.120 This difference in status engendered a regime 
that privileged the settlers. So, by the time that the PLO embraced partition as the solution to the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict, a settler lobby jealous of its constituents’ privileges could enlist the 
government to deploy the military to protect the settlement project, despite the resulting 
conflict’s human and material cost. 
Discrimination against the Palestinians was both economic and political. The economic 
manifestations include land expropriation along with the unequal allocation of water and basic 
infrastructure. To assist settlement expansion, the Israeli government initiated a mass 
expropriation of land in the West Bank while concurrently placing restrictions on Palestinian 
development. 
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The settlement project started slowly. Following the Six Day War, Labor Minister Yigal 
Allon proposed Israel annexing most of the Jordan Valley, East Jerusalem, and the Etzion Bloc 
directly south of Jerusalem while either returning the rest of the West Bank to Jordan or granting 
the Palestinian residents autonomy. According to the plan, civilian settlements along the Jordan 
Valley would secure the country’s eastern border. The then governing Labor Party de facto 
adopted this proposal121 and commenced expropriating private Palestinian land where it wanted 
to build settlements. 
During the first decade of the occupation, the primary method of expropriating land 
involved regional commanders in the military administration requisitioning it for “military 
purposes.”122 In the early years of the occupation, the Israeli Supreme Court accepted the 
government’s stance that the settlements represented part of the national defense system and 
accordingly ruled that the requisitions were legal.123 However, when Menachem Begin’s Likud 
Party came to power in 1977, settling all of the Territories, not just those parts deemed 
strategically significant, became a priority. The Likud’s 1977 platform stressed that “between the 
sea and Jordan there will only be Israeli sovereignty… [and] settlement, both urban and rural, in 
all parts of the Land of Israel is the focal point of the Zionist effort to redeem the country.”124 
When the Begin government requisitioned private Palestinian land south of Nablus to 
build a settlement, the Supreme Court in a 1979 decision quashed the plan on the grounds that 
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military requisition was unjustified due to the minimal strategic benefit of the planned 
settlement.125 If Likud wanted to fulfill its commitment to settling Israelis throughout the 
Territories unencumbered, they required a new mechanism for expropriating land. Henceforth, 
the government’s favored method of commandeering real estate was to utilize an Ottoman law to 
declare it state land. Under the Ottoman Land Law, one was entitled to cultivate land that he had 
continuously farmed. While ten years of cultivation entitled the farmer to a deed of ownership, 
land not cultivated for three years in a row was liable to be seized and auctioned off.126 The 
Israeli government modified the law so that it can declare any land shown by aerial photo not to 
have been cultivated consecutively for ten years to be state land. This virtually guaranteed that 
the property would fall into settlers’ hands because Israeli law prohibits “alien persons,” a 
designation that encompasses practically all Palestinians, from building on or renting state land. 
Israeli law defines “alien persons” as those not falling into one of the following categories:  
1. An Israeli citizen 
2. One who has immigrated under the Law of Return 
3. One who is entitled to the status of immigrant under the Law of Return - i.e. a 
4. Jew by descent or religion 
5. A company controlled by (1), (2) or (3).127 
Between 1977 and 1992, the Likud either led the government (1977-84, 1988-92) or 
participated in a national unity government with the Labor Party. In that time, the number of 
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settlers in East Jerusalem grew from 45,000-50,000128 to 141,000129 while the settler population 
in the West Bank mushroomed from 4,400 to 100,500.130 
Part and parcel of colonizing the West Bank was constraining the geographic expansion 
of Palestinian settlement in the Territories. Military Order 393 (1970) empowered any military 
commander to prohibit, halt, or impose conditions on construction for the security of the Israel 
Defense Force (IDF) or to ensure public order. Building was prohibited around IDF installations, 
Israeli settlements, including whole settlement blocs (e.g. Gush Etzion, Givat Ze’ev), and the 
roads connecting settlements. This tool was also used to curb urban sprawl around West Bank 
cities.131 Also to that end, the military commander issued in 1971 the Order Concerning the Law 
for Planning Cities, Villages, and Buildings (No. 418), which endowed a Supreme Planning 
Council, composed of appointees of the Military Governor, to “nullify any municipal decisions 
in matters of planning and zoning and to forbid housing development within or outside the 
corporate limits of any town, even though an area may have already been zoned residential.”132 
Although Israel frequently tweaked the organization of the bureaucracy governing the 
Territories between 1967 and 1994, for example, none of these diminished the system of 
discrimination described above. Even the formation of the Palestinian National Authority (PA) in 
1994 did not stop settlement expansion, land expropriation, and the unequal provision of water. 
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And, in most of the West Bank, separate criminal justice systems for Israelis and Palestinians 
persist, the latter being more draconian. 
The 1993 Oslo Accords divided the Territories into three zones: Areas A, B, and C. In 
Area A (c. 18 percent of the West Bank), the PA possesses full civilian and security control. 
Initially, PA civilian control meant governance by a popularly elected president and Palestine 
Legislative Council. However, Yasser Arafat, the first president of the PA, assumed dictatorial 
powers133 and his successor, Mahmoud Abbas, has governed without the Palestine Legislative 
Council since 2007, despite his term in office expiring in 2009. The PA enjoys civilian control in 
Area B while Israel exercises security control. And, in Area C, which constitutes approximately 
60 percent of the West Bank, Israel retains control over both civilian and security matters. 
The approximately 180,000 Palestinians residing in Area C have access to less than one 
percent of the land, the rest either being reserved for settlements (housing 400,000 Israelis134) or 
belonging to closed military zones and nature reserves.135 Yet, even the Palestinians living on the 
few unappropriated scraps of Area C face pressure to leave, finding it almost impossible to get 
building permits. From 2000 to 2012, Palestinians in Area C submitted 3,750 applications for 
building permits, of which 211 (5.6 percent) were approved. And, between 2009 and 2012, the 
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number was just 37 (2.3 percent).136 Consequently, most Palestinians never even apply for a 
permit before commencing construction, despite the constant threat of demolition.137 
Palestinians also need permits from Israeli authorities for all water-related projects, from 
building new wells and repairing old ones to merely constructing water cisterns.138 From 1967 to 
1996, only 13 permits were granted. They were all for domestic use and did not even compensate 
for the wells that had dried up or fallen into disrepair.139 Israeli settlers, on the other hand, enjoy 
virtually unfettered access to water for domestic, agricultural, and recreational purposes. As a 
result, Israeli settlers’ per capita water consumption is four times that of their Palestinian 
neighbors,140 who get by on 70 liters a day, 30 less than the World Health Organization’s 
recommended daily minimum.141 
Maintaining this discriminatory regime in the Territories imposes a heavy burden on the 
Israeli taxpayer. If one calculates the cost of the occupation of the Territories as the government 
expenditure on security and settler subsidies minus the income derived from control of the area, 
the annual cost of the Occupation in 2008 was $6.84 billion, 8.72 percent of the Israeli budget.142 
Initially, the occupation was profitable because the Territories were a captive market for Israeli 
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goods; Israeli employers could hire cheap Arab labor; the taxes collected from Palestinians in the 
Territories exceeded expenditure on them; the expropriation of land enriched settlers; and the 
appropriation of water found in the West Bank benefitted all Israelis.143 However, the 
occupation’s profitability depended on low security costs. Until the civil disobedience and low-
intensity violence of the First Intifada engulfed the Territories in 1987, Israel could control the 
area with relatively few troops. Since that time, security costs have consistently made retaining 
the West Bank an economic burden.144 
The growth of the settler population has also contributed to that burden because the 
government generously subsidizes the settlers’ lifestyle. Israel spends on average more than 
twice as much per capita on services, such as education and healthcare, in the settlements than it 
does in other municipalities.145 The settlers also pay lower taxes. In 2001, their income tax rate, 
health tax rate and kindergarten fee were respectively 10 percent, 30 percent, and 50 percent 
lower than in Israel proper. At the same time, thanks to government subsidies, mortgage interest 
rates were less than half those outside of the settlements.146 
The settlers’ formidable lobby explains why successive Israeli governments have incurred 
the costs of occupying the Territories. Unlike the Palestinian inhabitants of East Jerusalem and 
the West Bank, Israeli settlers can vote in national elections and, since the 1980s, their votes have 
often proven decisive. The pro-settler Likud Party would have lost the 1981, 1984, and 1988 
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parliamentary elections were it not for the settlers’ votes.147 Likewise, the settlers accounted for 
Likud’s narrow margin of victory in the 1996 election for Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu 
besting the Labor Party’s candidate, Shimon Peres, by less than one percentage point.148 
When Labor won the prime ministerial election in 1999, their party leader, Ehud Barak, 
ran on a platform of retaining control of all of Jerusalem along with the territory on which a 
majority of the settlers lived. Barak appeared to differ little with Netanyahu on the peace 
process149 and formed a coalition including three parties that served in Netanyahu’s government, 
Shas, the National Religious Party, and Yisrael BaAliyah. After his election, Barak focused on 
withdrawing Israeli troops from Lebanon and unsuccessfully negotiating peace with Syria, 
leaving the status of the Territories on the backburner. 
However, in 2000, Barak committed to resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict through a 
permanent status deal that would be negotiated at a summit and ratified by a referendum. 
President Clinton offered to host the summit at Camp David. But, before Barak could attend, he 
lost his parliamentary majority when Shas, the National Religious Party, and Yisrael BaAliyah 
resigned in protest.150 Barak and Arafat’s inability to reach a territorial compromise at Camp 
David in July contributed to the outbreak of the Second Intifada in September. In November, 
Barak called for an early election for Prime Minister, which was held the following February. 
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Barak lost in a landslide to the Likud candidate, Ariel Sharon, and the Labor Party never won 
another election. 
The Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland and the Colony of Kenya 
Britain’s commitment from 1959 to terminating white minority rule in Central Africa 
reveals that democracies do not reflexively indulge loyalists. By the early 1960s, approximately 
368,000 politically privileged whites inhabited the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland 
(Central African Federation: CAF) and Kenya. In the CAF, a majority of the whites, 220,000, 
lived in Southern Rhodesia while 75,000 and 7,000 lived in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland 
respectively.151 Then in Kenya, 66,000 whites152 lived beside 177,000 Asians, many of whom 
feared majority rule even more than did the whites.153 However, despite an intensive lobbying 
campaign at Westminster organized by the CAF government, the loyalists could not sway the 
Macmillan government because, unlike the Algerian and Israeli settlers, they lacked 
representation in Parliament. 
Rhodesia reflected the British ambition to control a continuous band of territory from 
Cairo to the Cape. Cecil Rhodes, an imperialist ideologue with a thirst for gold, and a few 
associates negotiated a concession from the Matabele King Lobengula that granted the former 
complete and exclusive charge of all the metals found in his kingdom. Alarmed by Boer and 
Portuguese designs on Central Africa, the British government chartered Rhodes’s British South 
Africa Company (BSAC), which was empowered to govern territory, raise its own police force, 
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and distribute land among settlers in what would become Rhodesia.154 The, BSAC encountered 
no difficulty raising equity as Rhodes assured stockholders that gold mines like those discovered 
in the Transvaal existed in Matabeleland. However, the pioneers recruited to settle the land found 
little mineral wealth and many departed rather than becoming farmers.155 
To ensure the BSAC’s profitability, Rhodes needed to find a way to make agriculture 
attractive to potential settlers and promising cheap native labor for European farms would be the 
draw.156 Henceforth, the Rhodesian government’s raison d'être was providing a comfortable 
living for Europeans at the expense of the indigenous population. This took the form of seizing 
vast tracts of land and coercing Africans to till it for meager pay, government subsidization of 
European agricultural products, and labor laws that protected white men’s wages. Throughout, 
this discriminatory regime depended on a restricted franchise upholding white minority rule. 
However, starting in 1959, each British government maintained that the cost of preserving the 
regime outstripped the benefits of decolonization and majority rule and no amount of lobbying 
could alter Westminster’s policy. 
The large-scale appropriation of land commenced with the BSAC’s defeat of Lobengula 
in the 1893 Matabele War, which destroyed the Matabele Kingdom. Before the war, the BSAC 
promised each military volunteer five alluvial claims and a 6,000 acre farm. Thus, already by the 
middle of 1894, “a large portion of the ‘gold belt areas’ with their richer soils had passed into 
European hands.”157 To guarantee an African labor force, the BSAC levied a ten shillings hut tax 
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on every adult male. Starting in 1895 the Africans had to pay the tax in cash rather than in kind, 
meaning that they either had to sell goods for cash or earn a salary working on the new European 
farms.158  
Land alienation intensified after Company rule ended with a 1922 referendum in which 
the electorate of Southern Rhodesia voted in favor of responsible government, which London 
granted in 1923, transforming Southern Rhodesia into a self-governing Crown colony. Land 
expropriation reached its apogee with the 1930 Land Apportionment Act, which allocated 51 
percent of Southern Rhodesia’s best land to the whites, prohibiting Africans from purchasing 
land in the European area.159 By, 1941, the Rhodesian government relocated to native reserves at 
least 50,000 Africans inhabiting the land demarcated for European settlement.160 
When the Rhodesian government in 1960 proposed rescinding the 1930 Land 
Apportionment Act, the hardline Rhodesian Front won the 1962 election by insisting in its 
platform, “The pattern and principle of racial differentiation in the ownership, use, and tenure of 
land established under the Land Apportionment Act must be maintained.”161 The official 1962 
Report of the Advisory Committee on the Development of the Economic Resources of Southern 
Rhodesia (the Phillips Report) highlighted the discriminatory consequences of the act, dividing 
Rhodesian land into six categories according to rainfall and agricultural potential. Group I was 
the most suitable for cash crop production and of the 1,515,000 acres in that category, Europeans 
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owned 1,235,000. Europeans similarly owned large majorities of the land in Groups II and III, 
which was also suitable for raising cash crops. A bare majority of Group IV, which could only be 
used for livestock, was also in European hands, Africans only owning majorities of Groups V 
and VI. Group V was less suitable for raising livestock than Group IV while Group VI could not 
be utilized for agriculture at all.162 
To protect white farmers from the minority of Africans that did own arable land, the 
Southern Rhodesian Legislative Assembly passed the 1931 Maize Control Act, which created the 
Maize Control Board ostensibly to stabilize prices during the Great Depression and guarantee the 
supply of maize to the cities and towns. In reality, the scheme was designed to subsidize 
European maize production and prevent Africans from underselling them. The Board paid higher 
prices for maize grown by settlers and restricted the movement of African grain to towns and 
mines. This was judged necessary even though the roads and rail lines were designed specifically 
to impede the transportation of African produce.163 
White urban workers likewise desired protection from African competition. The 1934 
Industrial Conciliation Act established industrial boards that mediated compulsory wage 
agreements between employers and unions and then excluded Africans from its definition of 
employee, leaving them subject to the 1902 Masters and Servants Act that forbade them from 
forming unions or engaging in collective bargaining.164 At the same time, the Act granted 
European-run unions control over apprenticeships, which they reserved for whites. And, since 
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the law also mandated equivalent salaries for whites and Africans doing the same jobs, Africans 
were effectively barred from skilled and semi-skilled work because they could neither acquire 
adequate training nor exploit the cheapness of their labor.165 Naturally, the equal pay provision 
did not apply to cheap African farm laborers. Only in 1959, as the British government committed 
itself to speedy decolonization and majority rule, did Southern Rhodesia amend the 1934 
legislation to permit some Africans to unionize, but not farm laborers, domestic workers, public 
servants, and Railway employees.166 
Northern Rhodesia’s discriminatory regime was only slightly less oppressive than 
Southern Rhodesia’s. The difference is attributable to Northern Rhodesia being administered 
directly by the British government rather than by an assembly accountable to local settlers. It was 
the fear of increasing settler influence that ensured that Northern Rhodesian African opinion 
would oppose Northern Rhodesia’s federation with Southern Rhodesia and Nyasaland in 1953. 
Still, from the days of BSAC rule through its time as a British protectorate (1924-64), many of 
the despotic practices in Southern Rhodesia made their way north. Native taxes compelled 
Africans to work in Northern Rhodesia’s copper mines,167 where they earned less than a thirtieth 
of the lowest-paid European miner’s salary.168 Additionally, the colonial government established 
native reserves to remove Africans from the most sought after land in the territory.169 
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After the Second World War, Southern Rhodesia lobbied for the amalgamation of the 
Rhodesias to access a larger African labor force and share the foreign currency earnings from 
Northern Rhodesia’s copper exports.170 Simultaneously, many Northern Rhodesia whites desired 
amalgamation to free themselves from Colonial Office rule and vest all power in the settlers’ 
hands.171 While Westminster ruled out amalgamation in the face of universal African opposition 
in Northern Rhodesia, it compromised by creating a federation including the Rhodesias and the 
neighboring Nyasaland Protectorate. The Colonial Office would continue to govern Northern 
Rhodesia and Nyasaland, but a new Federal Assembly and executive would handle defense, 
foreign affairs, customs, immigration, and several dozen other matters.172 
Despite British hopes that the CAF might serve as an example of racial partnership in 
contrast with the newly installed Apartheid regime in South Africa, Godfrey Huggins, the CAF’s 
first prime minister compared the partnership to that between a horse and his rider.173 While the 
CAF’s restrictive franchise always preserved European predominance, in 1957 it was amended 
so that Africans could no longer elect nationalist candidates. Henceforth, a racial cross-voting 
scheme would ensure that only African politicians palatable to Europeans could win election. 
Under this new system, 15 of the 59 seats in the Federal Assembly were reserved for 
representatives of the Africans, five from each territory, although one from each was white. The 
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other 44 members of the legislature were all white.174 And, when the Federal Assembly first 
convened, the African members were asked not to use the building’s lavatories to avoid 
offending their European fellow parliamentarians.175 
Kenya’s system of European settler hegemony developed along the same lines as 
Rhodesia’s. Yet, when Britain occupied Kenya, white settlement was merely an afterthought. 
British India’s security depended on keeping the Suez Canal open in times of war and any 
foreign presence on the Nile was perceived as a threat to passage through the Canal. 
Accordingly, British strategic planners considered controlling the Nile’s headwaters, located in 
present day Uganda, to be vital. So, in order to be able to dispatch troops quickly to landlocked 
Uganda, Britain needed to construct a railroad from the eastern coast of Africa to Uganda and 
protecting that railroad would entail administering the territory around it. In 1895, the British 
government declared the territory that would become Kenya the East Africa Protectorate and 
construction of the Uganda Railway began the following year at the port of Mombasa. 
London saddled the East Africa Protectorate with maintaining the expensive railway and 
Sir Charles Eliot, the Protectorate’s second commissioner, concluded that the settlement of 
export-oriented European farmers would generate the revenue to pay for it.176 The climate of the 
central highlands was conducive to European habitation and the 1902 Crown Lands Ordinance 
authorized them to purchase or lease at nominal prices large parcels of land in the area. However, 
the settlers lacked the capital and desire to work the large estates that they acquired, the average 
farm in 1932 covering more than 2,400 acres.177 Therefore, the colonial administration would 
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have to compel the local Africans to abandon their own farms and work for the Europeans for the 
depressed wages necessary to make their estates profitable. 
To this end, the colonial authorities ultimately allocated 33 percent of the country’s arable 
land to the Europeans for their exclusive use (the White Highlands),178 restricting African 
landownership to reserves for each tribe.179 Land crowding on the reserves drove many Africans 
to work on European farms.180 And, when this did not supply an adequate labor force for the 
European farms, the colonial authorities levied poll and hut taxes that, like in Rhodesia, forced 
many Africans to seek wage labor.181 Even loaded with these encumbrances, the colonial 
government feared Africans underselling European farmers and prohibited them from growing 
coffee, tea, and pyrethrum, restrictions that were only eased and lifted in the 1940s and 50s.182 
Starting in the 1950s, the settler regimes in the CAF and Kenya faced acute African 
nationalist agitation. Land-starved Kenyans launched the Mau Mau Uprising that primarily 
targeted African collaborators, but occasionally involved the murder of European farmers and 
British security personnel. However, the uprising, which was fought mainly between 1952 and 
1956, was cheaply suppressed, claiming the lives of only 63 European soldiers and police along 
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with 32 European civilians183 while the counterinsurgency operations cost less than £60 
million.184 Then in 1959, at the prodding of CAF Prime Minister Roy Welensky, the governors of 
Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia declared states of emergency in reaction to increasingly 
violent demonstrations by African nationalists. 
The disturbances where particularly severe in Nyasaland, where the Hastings Banda 
assumed the leadership of the Nyasaland African Congress in 1958 and campaigned for the 
Protectorate’s secession from the Federation and majority rule. By early 1959, Banda could 
barely restrain the more hotheaded African nationalists. In January a mob attacked a police 
station in Zomba and then in February nationalists briefly seized the airfield at Fort Hill.185 To 
quell the turmoil, Robert Armitage, the Governor of Nyasaland requested the dispatch of 
Southern Rhodesian forces and declared a state of emergency as confrontations between the 
Rhodesian troops and African demonstrators caused casualties to mount. 
Despite the relatively low cost of the suppression of African secessionist activity in 
Kenya and the CAF, the Macmillan government already saw colonial commitments as an 
obstacle to necessary retrenchment and could no longer justify the continuation of conscription 
to the electorate. In April 1957, Iain Macleod, the Minister of Labour and National Service, 
announced that those born after October 1939 would not be conscripted and the unpopular 
national service was rapidly phased out, the last conscript entering service in 1960.186 Ending 
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conscription helped the Conservatives win the 1959 election,187 but accelerated the pace of 
decolonization. 
After the 1959 Conservative electoral victory, Macmillan transferred Macleod to the 
Colonial Office, where he, and then his successor as Secretary of State for the Colonies, 
Reginald Maudling, presided over the imposition of majority rule in Kenya, Nyasaland, and 
Northern Rhodesia. Majority rule, as expected, translated into demands for independence in 
those territories, which Britain promptly granted. 
Kenya’s path to majority rule began when Macleod convened the Lancaster House 
Conference in January 1960. The conference’s objective was fashioning a constitution that would 
move Kenya towards independence. Macleod’s opening speech left no doubt that that meant 
majority rule,188 which was anathema to the majority of Kenya’s whites. In the 1956-57 elections 
for the Legislative Council of Kenya, the Independent Group Party, which opposed any reform of 
the discriminatory colonial system, won a majority of the white seats. However, the advocates of 
the status quo lost their influence when the Lancaster House Conference reconfigured the 
Legislative Council to give the Africans a majority of one.189 Later in 1960, the Kenya (Land) 
Order-in-Council abolished the White Highlands, opening the area to settlement by members of 
any race.190 By 1960, Kenyan independence was a fait accompli and the resulting political 
uncertainty caused land prices in the former White Highlands to plummet to a fifth of their 
value.191 
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Macleod simultaneously worked towards ending minority rule in the CAF. Over the 
objections of Armitage and Welensky, Macleod engineered Banda’s release on 1 April 1960 and 
convened a constitutional conference that August in London that ensured an African majority on 
the Nyasaland Legislative Council in the 1961 elections.192 Consequently, Nyasaland’s secession 
from the CAF and independence from Britain were only a matter of time, reaching fulfillment in 
1964. 
The release of the Monckton Report in October 1960 then jumpstarted Northern 
Rhodesia’s march to independence. Commissioned by Westminster after the state of emergency 
declarations in 1959, the report concluded that only armed force could preserve the CAF unless 
its racially discriminatory legislation were abandoned and Africans given more legislative 
representation.193 Kenneth Kaunda, the leader of the United National Independence Party 
(UNIP), the more radical of Northern Rhodesia’s two largest African parties, substantiated the 
Monckton Commission’s findings when he threatened an uprising on the scale of Mau Mau 
when Welensky proposed a constitutional reform that would cement European control of 
Northern Rhodesia’s Legislative Council.194 London averted this insurrection by unveiling a new 
constitution for Northern Rhodesia in February 1962.195 Despite its still limited franchise the two 
African parties, UNIP and the Northern Rhodesian African National Congress, won a majority of 
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the Legislative Council’s seats and formed a coalition government committed to majority rule. 
Northern Rhodesia seceded from the CAF in 1963 and gained independence in 1964. 
Like in French Algeria and the Palestinian territories, the settlers in British Africa lobbied 
to protect their privileges. However, unlike their French and Israeli counterparts, the British 
settlers lacked representation in the metropolis’s parliament making their lobbying futile. 
Welensky’s government accurately predicted that the turmoil in 1959 that culminated in the 
states of emergency would spook the British political class and jeopardize minority rule in the 
CAF. To forestall constitutional reforms by the Colonial Office, the Welensky government hired 
the advertising agency Colman, Prentis and Varley to improve the CAF’s image in Britain and 
win sympathy in Parliament. The CAF’s government chose that particular firm because it 
handled the Conservative Party’s account in the 1959 election and offered access to the 365 Tory 
MPs.196 
The propaganda campaign included full-page advertisements in British newspapers along 
with trips for MPs and other VIPs to the CAF. In the first year of the campaign, the government 
spent between £136,000 and £160,000, in part on illustrated articles depicting racial partnership 
while omitting any reference to Europeans’ privileged legal status.197 In all, 40 British MPs 
participated in the Welensky government’s PR tours. This number included 20 Labour MPs, 19 
Tories, and a Liberal. Welensky’s government also financed fact-finding missions by 
representatives of The Federation of British Industry and the National Farmer’s Union.198 
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However, the fruits of the propaganda campaign were meager. All that came of the 
Labour MPs’ tours was several abstaining from an opposition motion criticizing CAF policies.199 
On the Conservative side, Robin Turton introduced an Early Day Motion demanding that 
Macleod adhere to a 1958 White Paper on Northern Rhodesia drafted by his predecessor, Alan 
Lennox-Boyd, that advocated restricting the franchise to “those who are contributing to the 
wealth and welfare of the country.”200 Although 100 Conservative backbenchers eventually 
signed the motion, Macleod proceeded to design the electoral institutions that would produce an 
African majority in the 1962 Northern Rhodesian elections. In fact, after disingenuously 
claiming that the new electoral system would be consistent with the White Paper, Macleod even 
convinced 17 MPs to remove their names from the motion.201 
Due to the aristocratic pedigree of many of the Kenyan settlers, Macmillan feared that 
they could lobby more effectively than their Rhodesian counterparts.202 The Kenya National 
Farmers Union formed the backbone of the settler lobby. Although originally founded to address 
bread-and-butter issues such as guaranteed prices for produce and cheap credit for farmers, by 
the late 50s, the organization’s patrician membership was exploiting its political connections in 
London to preserve minority rule and European control of the White Highlands.203 Most of the 
union’s officers graduated from English public school, granting them access to much of the 
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Britain’s political elite, while the group’s president, Lord Delamere, lobbied directly in the 
House of Lords.204 Despite this access, the Kenyan lobby proved as feckless as Welensky’s. By 
1960, majority rule and Kenyan independence were a fait accompli and the settlers’ lobbying 
effort shifted to swaying Westminster to buy them out before an African-majority government 
could expropriate their choice land. Even here, the lobbying effort came up short as the 
government capped the valuation of farmhouses at £1,300 and used 1959 land values, even 
though the political unrest had by that time greatly depressed land values. Accordingly, most 
Kenyan farmers could not expect to maintain anything close to their standard of living.205 
Although there is a tendency to only consider Kenya’s European settlers as loyalists. 
According to this dissertation’s definition, the term also applies to the Asian community, which 
expected economic persecution in an independent Kenya. In the waning days of British Kenya, 
100,000 Asians rushed to obtain British passports.206 Under the British, Asians served as a 
middle class of “skilled artisans, clerks, postmasters, small businessmen, and middle-level 
administrators,” and feared economic discrimination at the hands of the African lower class of 
peasants and unskilled workers.207 These fears were well founded as Jomo Kenyatta promoted 
the Africanization of the economy with legislation such as the Immigration and Trade Licensing 
Acts of 1967, which required non-citizens to obtain expensive work permits of short duration to 
remain in the country. Since the Asians who acquired British passports had to forgo Kenyan 
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citizenship and the penalty for living in Kenya without a work permit included imprisonment and 
a thousand-pound fine, the aforesaid acts sparked an exodus of Asians from Kenya that only 
ended with the imposition of immigration restrictions by Britain, India, and Pakistan.208 
Just as Macmillan refused to use force to block the secession of Nyasaland, Northern 
Rhodesia, and Kenya, Harold Wilson proved unwilling to take military action to prevent 
Southern Rhodesia’s 1965 Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI). When the British 
government refused to budge from its commitment to African majority rule in Southern 
Rhodesia, the Rhodesian cabinet declared independence to preserve the status quo. Wilson 
implored Rhodesians to disregard UDI, but did not authorize military action to thwart it,209 even 
though he would have enjoyed the backing of the international community. The UN General 
Assembly passed a resolution 107-to-two demanding that Britain end “the rebellion by the 
unlawful authorities in Salisbury.”210 
British Ireland 
The decolonization of Kenya and the CAF does not betoken a universal British 
commitment to the right of self-determination. Irish history uniquely illustrates enfranchised 
loyalists’ role in hindering secession. Although England first invaded Ireland in the twelfth 
century, the recent conflict descends from the seventeenth century policy of importing loyalist 
Protestants to settle the Catholic-majority country. After England defeated the secessionist 
Confederation of Irish Lords and their Spanish allies in 1603, King James I decided to create the 
Protestant Plantation in Ulster, the region most supportive of the secessionists. After 
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expropriating most of Ulster’s land, James I granted English and Scottish colonists estates on 
which they paid rents to the Crown. The government required the colonists to import Protestant 
tenants from England and Scotland while consigning Irish Catholics to the remaining areas.211 
In 1641, while England was preoccupied with the civil war between Charles I and 
Parliament, representatives of the Irish Catholic gentry founded the Irish Catholic Confederation. 
Disgruntled by Catholics’ increasing exclusion from public office and the redistribution of their 
land to Protestants, they decided to swear allegiance to King Charles publically while forcibly 
regaining alienated property.212 The Catholic insurgents ethnically cleansed the Protestant 
planters in much of Ulster, killing an estimated 4,000 while another 8,000 refugees died of 
privations.213 This reversal only lasted, however, until Parliament executed King Charles I and 
Oliver Cromwell reconquered Ireland from the Irish Catholic Confederation, which had aligned 
itself with the Royalists and permitted Charles II to assemble troops in Ireland for a planned 
invasion of England. 
After Cromwell completed Ireland’s reconquest, the English Parliament passed a series of 
Acts, culminating in the Act of Settlement of 1652, that transferred more than 2 million acres of 
Catholic-owned land to soldiers and “adventurers” who participated in the island’s 
pacification.214 The result was that Catholics, who owned 60 percent of Ireland’s land in 1640, 
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owned only 8 percent by 1660.215 Although Irish Catholics would regain some lost ground after 
the Restoration of the monarchy, particularly under the Catholic King James II, Catholic 
landownership still remained a fraction of the pre-Civil War number, standing at about 29% in 
the 1680s.216 
When Parliament invited Protestant William of Orange and his wife Mary Stuart, one of 
James II’s Protestant daughters, to assume the throne, most of Ireland’s Catholic population 
sided with the deposed king. William’s victory over James II at the Battle of the Boyne in 1690 
heralded the beginning of the Protestant Ascendancy in Ireland. Members of the Parliament of 
Ireland were required to make a declaration against transubstantiation, thereby excluding 
Catholics from the Irish Parliament. This disability continued after the unification of the Irish and 
British parliaments in 1800, Catholics only regaining the right to sit in Parliament in 1829. 
Catholics were barred from voting from 1728 until 1793. Legislation passed in 1703 prohibited 
Catholics from purchasing land and required the subdivision of estates among heirs in place of 
primogeniture, unless one son converted to Anglicanism. Then, he inherited the entire estate. 
Catholics were also disqualified from acquiring land from Protestants through marriage or 
inheritance.217 As a result of this discriminatory legislation, Catholic landownership fell to only 5 
percent by 1775.218 
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Despite Parliament gradually throughout the late eighteenth and early nineteenth 
centuries repealing the discriminatory legislation against Catholics, legal equality alone alone 
could not reverse the massive inequality in wealth and landownership between the Catholic 
majority and Protestant minority. Land reform bills in 1870, 1881, 1885, and 1887 only enabled 
a small percentage of Catholic tenants to purchase the land that they rented. And, increasingly, 
Irish Catholic frustrations were channeled into the Home Rule movement, which involved the 
creation of an Irish parliament that would legislate on domestic affairs. Although not overt 
secession, Home Rule threatened the economic hegemony of the Ireland’s Protestant elite 
because it entailed land redistribution and an executive dedicated to Catholic tenants’ interests at 
the expense of disproportionately Anglican landlords. Additionally, many Irish Protestants feared 
that an Irish parliament would curtail their religious liberty, hence the slogan, “Home Rule means 
Rome Rule.” 
The 1892 British general election brought a minority Liberal government to power with 
the support of the Irish National League and Irish National Federation on the condition that 
William Gladstone table a Home Rule bill. Although he was assured of passing the bill in the 
House of Commons, Ireland’s Protestant landlord class was amply represented in the House of 
Lords, where they formed a bloc vote.219 The Duke of Devonshire, whose brother was 
assassinated while serving as the Chief Secretary of Ireland in 1882, summarized why the 
Protestant Irish dreaded Home Rule. First, the mainly Protestant landlords feared that a devolved 
Irish government would refuse to enforce the eviction of tenants for failing to pay rent. Second, 
Irish Protestants more generally assumed that their religious liberty and safety would be 
compromised “by a Government elected by a Party returned under the influence of Irish-
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American Fenians, dynamiters, and moonlighters.”220 Ultimately, the vote was 419-41 against 
the Home Rule bill In the House of Lords.221 
The ability of the Protestant Unionists to block Home Rule ended when the Parliament 
Act of 1911 divested the House of Lords of its legislative veto. Although Unionists were 
represented in the House of Commons too, so were the Irish Catholic Nationalists, who greatly 
outnumbered the them and could therefore blunt their influence after 1911. Thus, in 1912, a 
coalition of the Liberals and the Irish Parliamentary Party passed, over the militant objection of 
the Irish Unionists, a Home Rule bill that was never implemented due to the outbreak of the First 
World War. 
The Irish Unionists’ influence rebounded, however, in 1918 because of Sinn Fein’s policy 
of abstentionism. When Sinn Fein, a party committed to Irish independence, won the 
overwhelming number of constituencies in the Catholic parts of Ireland, they refused to take 
their seats at Westminster. Traditionally, the Irish Catholic Irish majority elected more MPs than 
the Protestant Unionists in Ulster, thereby minimizing the latter’s influence. But, when the 
Nationalist Irish MPs refused to take their seats in Parliament, they magnified the influence of 
the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP). So, when Sinn Fein and the Irish Republican Army (IRA) 
launched the Irish War of Independence (1919-21), the UUP played a pivotal role in the crafting 
of the Lloyd George Government’s policy, which included partitioning the island and granting 
the north, where the vast majority of Protestants lived, their own parliament and more autonomy 
than any other part of Britain. Furthermore, when drawing the partition boundaries, the Unionists 
                                                 
220HL Deb. 5 September 1893, Series 4, Vol. 17 cols. 39-43. 
221Lawrence James (2009) Aristocrats: Power, Grace, and Decadence: Britain’s Great Ruling Classes from 1066 to 
the Present. New York: St. Martin’s Press. p. 323. 
 95 
achieved their maximalist aims. Although Protestants were in the majority in only four Irish 
counties (Antrim, Armagh, Londonderry, and Down), the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) prevailed 
upon the Lloyd George Government to add the Catholic-majority counties of Fermanagh and 
Tyrone, even though doing so swelled the number of Irish Nationalists in Northern Ireland, 
greatly increasing the probability of future conflicts in the territory, conflicts bound to impose a 
hefty cost on Britain in money and lives.222 As long as the Dáil Éireann refused to accept 
partition, the Ulster Unionists induced the British government to continue the war in Ireland. 
The regime established by the UUP in Northern Ireland discriminated against Catholics 
electorally, in the provision of council housing, and in public employment. The UUP, which 
governed Northern Ireland from 1921 to 1972, sought to limit Catholic representation in both the 
Parliament of Northern Ireland at Stormont and in the local councils. To accomplish this, 
Stormont engaged in widespread gerrymandering and restricted the franchise for local council 
elections. The gerrymandering involved dividing towns into wards with unequal populations that 
elected equivalent numbers of councilors. Unionists controlled the Derry Corporation 12-8 
despite the city’s Catholic majority because the division of city into wards translated into the 
Unionists winning a seat for every 1,541 votes while the Nationalists averaged 3,665 votes per 
seat. In some counties, the gerrymandering was even more brazen. The Armagh County Council 
returned a 23-5 Unionist majority with the population per Unionist seat averaging 1,638 while 
electing a Nationalist required about 7,098 votes. The most egregious case was no doubt the 
Lurgan Borough Council, where 551 Unionists elected 15 councilors while 5,449 Nationalists 
could not elect even one.223 
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At the same time, only home-owning ratepayers could vote in local council elections, 
disenfranchising Catholics who were disproportionately renters. Consequently, the number of 
people eligible to vote in Northern Irish local council elections was only two-thirds of the 
number who could vote in British general elections.224 In 1961, Catholics outnumbered 
Protestants in Derry 36,049 to 17,695. However, the restrictive franchise limited the electorate to 
14,325 Catholics and 9,235 Protestants, gerrymandering then converted that enlarged Protestant 
minority into the aforementioned 12-8 majority on the county council.225 
Since the local councils were responsible for the provision of public housing, electoral 
inequality translated into the inequitable provision of public housing. So, despite Fermanagh 
having a Catholic majority, 82 percent of the council houses constructed between 1945 and 1967 
were allotted to Protestants.226 Pleasing their Protestant constituents was not the Unionist-
controlled councils’ only motive for allocating housing inequitably. Housing policy was 
employed to further gerrymandering. The Cameron Commission, appointed by the Governor of 
Northern Ireland to investigate the outbreak of The Troubles, published its report in 1969 and 
concluded: 
There have been many cases where councils have withheld planning permission, or 
caused needless delays, where they believed a housing project would be to their electoral 
disadvantage… We have no doubt also, in light of the mass of evidence put before us, 
that in these Unionist-controlled areas it was fairly frequent for housing policy to be 
operated so that houses allocated to Catholics tended, as in Dungannon Urban District, to 
go to rehouse slum dwellers, whereas Protestant allocations tended to go more frequently 
to new families. Thus the total numbers allocated were in rough correspondence to the 
proportion of Protestants and Catholics in the community; the principal criterion however 
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in such cases was not actual need but maintenance of the current political preponderance 
in the local government area.227 
After Westminster created the Fair Employment Agency for Northern Ireland, it was 
discovered that the Catholic unemployment rate was double the Protestant one.228 This is in part 
attributable to discrimination in public employment. Only five percent of the Belfast 
Corporation’s employees were Catholic in 1928 even though Catholics constituted a quarter of 
the city’s population.229 In Catholic-majority Derry in the mid-1960s, only 18 percent of the 
Corporation’s employees were Catholic.230 Although some Nationalist Catholics refused to seek 
public employment on principled grounds, UUP leaders’ repeated pleas to Protestants not to hire 
Catholics also played a role. Sir Basil Brooke, who served as Northern Ireland’s Prime Minister 
from 1943 to 1963, delivered a speech when he was still Minister of Agriculture in which he 
implored Loyalists to hire Protestants whenever possible. And, when called upon to retract the 
appeal, he doubled down, insisting that 99 percent of Catholics are disloyal to the state. The then 
Prime Minister of Northern Ireland, Lord Craigavon, rather than dissociating himself from the 
speech, insisted, “There is not one of my colleagues who does not entirely agree with him.”231  
After the Northern Irish authorities provoked the Troubles by violently suppressing the 
Northern Ireland Civil Rights Movement, which aimed to rectify the two aforesaid injustices, the 
UUP was able to use its electoral influence to further its objective of suppressing the Provisional 
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IRA’s secessionist campaign. When Labour won a majority of just three seats in the October 
1974 UK general election, both Labour and the Conservatives courted the UUP, each supporting 
a series of security measures from increasing surveillance operations and checkpoints to the 
official introduction of the SAS into Northern Ireland. A series of by-election defeats pushed the 
Labour Party even more into the arms of the UUP, negotiating a pact with them, the terms of 
which included increasing Northern Ireland’s representation at Westminster.232 At the UUP’s 
request, John Major established a Select Committee on Northern Irish Affairs. 
The brief disintegration of UUP party discipline during the dissolution of the Stormont 
Parliament in 1973 followed by party unity’s reimposition in 1974 illustrates the Irish Loyalists’ 
political clout. In 1973, UUP MPs were divided on whether Westminster should abolish the 
Parliament of Northern Ireland and introduce direct rule, some UUP MPs favoring the imposition 
of direct rule as a step towards full integration with UK. Brian Faulkner, the Prime Minister of 
Northern Ireland and leader of the UUP, reminded the parliamentary delegation that support for 
Stormont’s preservation was a condition of UUP membership.233 So, when Westminster 
abolished the Parliament of Northern Ireland, the UUP MPs voted unanimously against it. 
However, the unanimous vote was purely symbolic because the 1973 Northern Ireland 
Constitution Act enjoyed support among all of the major parties and was passed overwhelmingly. 
If the UUP were truly united in its opposition to direct rule, its Westminster MPs could have 
threatened to use their votes in Parliament to undermine the Heath Government on close votes on 
more controversial bills. As an insurance policy against that, Heath immediately offered the 
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position of Secretary of State for Employment to Robin Chichester-Clark, the chairman of the 
UUP at Westminster. Chichester-Clark’s appointment completely fractured the unity between the 
moderate and hardline elements within the UUP, undermining their efforts to lobby effectively. 
However, after the UUP moderates were flushed out in the February 1974 general election, the 
Conservatives and the Labour Party courted a more united UUP. In the February 1974 election 
the Labour Party won four more seats than the Conservatives, meaning that Heath likely could 
have formed the government had he not alienated the hardline members of the UUP.234 
Dictatorships that Initiate Secession 
There are only two cases of this phenomenon. First, in 1968, Francoist Spain peacefully 
decolonized Spanish Guinea. At that time, Spain was attempting to persuade third-world 
countries to recognize its sovereignty over Gibraltar and to upgrade economic relations with 
Spain despite its fascist government. Madrid hoped that unilateral decolonization of an 
economically worthless235 territory before a cohesive self-determination movement had even 
emerged might win them some sympathy. How the Salazar regime’s colonial wars were 
transforming Portugal into an international pariah was never far from Spanish policymakers’ 
minds.236 
The same logic did not, however, apply to Spanish Sahara, where the Spanish resisted the 
POLISARIO’s secessionist campaign. Since Morocco and Mauritania each claimed sovereignty 
of Spanish Sahara and international opinion was divided regarding its rightful status, Madrid 
faced less international pressure to evacuate. Thus, Spain is less an example of a dictatorship 
                                                 
234John Charmley (2008) A History of Conservative Politics Since 1830. Houndmills: Macmillan. p. 204. 
235Oil was not discovered in Equatorial Guinea until 1996. 
236Alicia Campos (2003) “The Decolonization of Equatorial Guinea: The Relevance of the International Factor,” The 
Journal of African History, 44(1): 95-116. 
 100 
consenting to secessionists’ demands than a dictatorship unilaterally jettisoning a burdensome 
territory even before secessionist demands became pronounced. 
The second example of a dictator initiating secession is the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union. To reverse the economic stagnation dating from the Brezhnev years, Gorbachev 
concocted a plan of economic liberalization (perestroika). When bureaucratic resistance and 
corruption sabotaged reform, he pursued political liberalization (glasnost and demokratizatsiia) 
to mobilize the population against the entrenched party interests obstructing reform (Suny 1998, 
Strayer 1998). In June 1986, the Main Administration for Affairs of Literature along with the 
Union of Writers started relaxing censorship, resulting in the fluorescence of an opposition press 
(Smith 2005). Because curtailing censorship proved unequal to the task, Gorbachev proposed at 
the 19th Party Conference in June-July 1988 establishing a USSR Congress of People’s Deputies 
whose membership would be divided between candidates elected by public organizations and 
candidates directly elected by the population. This new body would elect a Supreme Soviet that 
would be independent of the Communist Party and would play a supervisory role over the 
government. 
Gorbachev is the unique dictator who, rather than cultivating an image of toughness to 
deter dissidents, consciously empowered dissidents. In so doing, not only did he invigorate the 
opponents in the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR) to the Communist 
Party’s monopoly on power, namely Boris Yeltsin, he also galvanized secessionists in the 
fourteen other soviet republics. Ultimately, these two dissident forces aroused by Gorbachev 
would unite to oust him. 
In the late 80s, Yeltsin became an increasingly vocal critic of Gorbachev and rival for 
power. Gorbachev engineered Yeltsin’s dismissal from the post of First Party Secretary of the 
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Moscow Communist Party in 1987 and compelled the Central Committee to remove him from 
his position as a candidate member of the Politburo. The 1989 elections for the Congress of 
People’s Deputies, however, revived Yeltsin’s fortunes. Along with many nationalist politicians 
in the Baltic and Georgian SSRs, Yeltsin was elected to the Congress of People’s Deputies. In 
May 1990, despite Gorbachev’s opposition, Yeltsin was elected chairman of the Presidium of the 
Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR. Then, in June 1991, Yeltsin defeated Gorbachev’s preferred 
candidate for President of the RSFSR. 
Simultaneously, recently elected nationalist politicians in the other republics commenced 
passing legislation contravening All-Union laws. Because Gorbachev’s power derived entirely 
from the All-Union institutions of the USSR, he strived to maintain the USSR’s territorial 
integrity through repeated attempts to negotiate a less centralized union that would mollify the 
leaders of the various SSRs. Yeltsin, on the other hand, who derived his power from the RSFSR, 
was simultaneously encouraging the SSRs to secede237 and he successfully negotiated the 
Commonwealth of Independent States in December 1991, thereby spelling the end of the USSR 
and his rival Gorbachev. 
The Anomalous Indian Case 
India is a democratic anomaly, militarily opposing secession even in the absence of an 
enfranchised loyalist population. Before Indian independence, Nehru entertained the possibility 
of minorities seceding, writing, “It may be desirable to fix a period, say ten years after the 
establishment of the free Indian state, at the end of which the right to secede may be exercised 
                                                 
237Shireen T. Hunter, Jeffrey L. Thomas, and Alexander Melikishvili (2004) Islam in Russia: The Politics of Identity 
and Security. Armonk: M. E. Sharp. p. 212. 
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through proper constitutional process and in accordance with the clearly expressed will of the 
inhabitants of the area concerned.”238 Yet, New Delhi invariably opposed secession after 1947. 
The two regions most beset by secessionist activity have been the Northeast states and 
Kashmir. In some of the Northeast states, such as Nagaland and Mizoram, the secessionists 
enjoyed widespread popular support239 and there is no evidence of loyalist populations there. 
Referenda on independence were never held. No local demographic group identified with India 
and/or enjoyed political privileges. Moreover, even if there were some undetectable loyalist 
minorities in Nagaland and Mizoram, they would not be represented in the Lok Sabha because, 
due to their small populations, the states send only one representative each. 
Even in Jammu and Kashmir, where a Hindu loyalist population feared persecution at the 
hands of Islamist secessionists,240 the loyalist numbers were so small compared with the national 
electorate at-large (less than one-half of one percent), they could not expect to affect New 
Delhi’s policy. Moreover, since Kashmir’s Muslims enjoyed the same rights as their Hindu 
neighbors, the secessionist majority in Kashmir would have neutralized the electoral influence of 
the loyalists anyway. 
India probably acts more like a dictatorship when confronted by secessionism because, 
like dictatorships, local and national Indian political elites have long felt the need to use violence 
to coerce social forces to back the state. In Bihar, landlords organized the Ranvir Sena death 
                                                 
238Gurharpal Singh (2001) “Resizing and Reshaping the State: India from Partition to the Present,” in Brendan 
O'Leary, Ian S. Lustick, and Thomas Callaghy ed.s. Right-sizing the State: The Politics of Moving Borders. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. p. 143, note 5. 
239Paul R. Brass (1994) The Politics of India Since Independence. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p. 202. 
240The exodus of 140,000 Hindus from the Kashmir Valley after March 1990 displays loyalist fears of the Islamist 
secessionists. See Victoria Schofield (2003) Kashmir in Conflict: India, Pakistan and the Unending War. London: 
I.B. Tauris. p. 151. 
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squad that carried out repeated massacres of Dalit farm laborers, some for demanding the 
minimum wage and others because they were suspected of supporting the Communist Party of 
India (Marxist-Leninist).241 Although Bihar’s government officially banned the Ranvir Sena, the 
police allied themselves with them to fight the Naxalite communist guerillas in the state and 
refused to intervene during repeated massacres of Dalits.242 Even though human rights groups 
pressured the Bihar government to set up the Amir Das commission to investigate Ranvir Sena’s 
activities, Chief Minister Nitish Kumar dissolved the commission before it could release its 
report, which, according to Justice Das, would have exposed Ranvir Sena’s ties to members of 
the Kumar government.243 
Indian politicians have also orchestrated riots against members of minority religions. In 
February 2002, hours after a fire killed 59 people, including Hindu pilgrims returning from 
Ayodhya, on a train in Godhra, Gujarat Chief Minister Narendra Modi blamed the Pakistani 
secret services and then ordered the bodies displayed in the state’s capital.244 Police stood idly by 
as over a thousand people died in the ensuing pogrom. In a sworn statement to the Supreme 
Court of India, Sanjiv Bhatt, a senior police officer in the Gujarat intelligence bureau in 2002, 
claimed that in a meeting the night before the pogrom Modi told officials that Muslims needed to 
be taught a lesson for the alleged arson at Godhra and that Hindus should be permitted to vent 
                                                 
241Smita Narula (1999) Broken People: Caste Violence Against India's “Untouchables.” Human Rights Watch. pp. 
49-51. 
242S. K. Ghosh (2000) Bihar in Flames. New Delhi: APH. pp. 57-58. 
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Naushin Rehman. 
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their anger.245 Government officials distributed voter lists to identify Muslim homes.246 Although 
most of the state officials involved avoided prosecution, Maya Kodnani, who was promoted after 
the pogrom to become Gujarat’s minister of women and child development, was convicted of 
inciting a mob that murdered 95 people in Naroda Patiya, a Muslim-majority industrial town.247 
At the national level, Congress Party leaders encouraged and aided the anti-Sikh rioters 
after the assassination of Indira Gandhi by two of her Sikh bodyguards in 1984.248 Although 
Rajiv Gandhi did not have a personal hand in the riots, he was slow to send the army to protect 
Sikh suburbs of Delhi and seemed to rationalize the violence when he mused, “When a great tree 
falls, the earth shakes.” 249 
This endemic violence in Indian politics suggests why New Delhi reacts like a 
dictatorship to secessionists. As discussed above, dictators fear that ignoring challenges to the 
regime, even if they pose no direct threat to their rule, signals vulnerability that may encourage 
revolutionaries or political rivals within the regime to confront them. Due to the long tradition of 
local and national Indian politicians sanctioning and directing violence, an Indian Prime Minister 
who permitted secession would likely be perceived as weak and face a leadership challenge. 
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248Martha C. Nussbaum (2008) The Clash Within: Democracy, Religious Violence, and India’s Future. Cambridge: 
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION  
The results of the csQCA and the case studies each strongly support this dissertation’s 
hypotheses except in relation to India. While this study postulates that India’s abysmal human 
rights record situates it right on the cusp of the democratic spectrum, inducing many of its 
politicians to behave more like autocrats in the face of secessionism, there is another explanation. 
Except for India, all the non-Western countries covered by this study were either dictatorships or, 
as in the cases of Turkey and Sri Lanka, confronted secessionist movements claiming territories 
containing enfranchised loyalists fearing persecution. That means that, except for India, this 
dissertation’s model expects every non-Western country to oppose secession militarily. Maybe 
non-Western states, democracies like India included, always violently resist secessionists 
initially. Singapore’s 1965 separation from the then democratic Malaysia is not an exception 
because Kuala Lumpur initiated the divorce, the Parliament of Malaysia unanimously voting to 
expel Singapore against the wishes of Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew. All the other 
democracies that this dissertation predicts would permit secession are either located in Europe, 
such as the Western colonial powers and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia when Montenegro 
seceded, or countries with Western cultural roots (e.g. Australia, New Zealand, the U.S., South 
Africa, and Israel). 
So, Turkey and Sri Lanka perhaps resorted to military force to thwart Kurdish and Tamil 
self-determination respectively because the countries were culturally non-Western and not to 
placate loyalists. Since the Varieties of Democracy (Liberal Democracy Index) suggests that 
neither Turkey nor Sri Lanka were even democratic when each launched its anti-secessionist 
counterinsurgency, one could argue that India is the only non-Western democracy that faced new 
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secessionist demands and did not merely inherit anti-secessionist wars from their non-democratic 
predecessors. And, it would be advisable not to base a theory on non-Western democracies’ 
attitudes toward secession on data from only one country. 
Although it reaches beyond the chronological scope of this study, readers of this 
dissertation will undoubtedly seek to apply its model to the American Civil War. Consequently, 
this dissertation ought to address it, especially because, at first glance, it seems to violate the 
predictions of this dissertation’s model. If the US was a democracy and the enfranchised loyalists 
in the South did not have reason to fear persecution at the hands of the Confederacy, why did the 
Lincoln Administration invade the South in 1861?  
While thousands of books touch on the origins of the Civil War, they focus on the reasons 
why the southern states seceded and only very rarely tackle why the Federal Government resisted 
secession. And, when they do, they usually attribute the Lincoln Administration’s actions to its 
members considering the Union’s preservation to be an indivisible good.250 War bargaining 
theorists, who generally dismiss the explanatory power of good indivisibility in explaining wars, 
would be even more skeptical in this case as Lincoln’s predecessor, James Buchanan,251 and a 
majority of Northern newspapers opposed using military force to preserve the Union in early 
1861.252 
One possible resolution to this puzzle is to acknowledge that, like the pre-1961 European 
colonial powers mentioned in the theory section, the Lincoln administration maintained that the 
                                                 
250See Paul C. Nagel (1964) One Nation Indivisible: The Union in American Thought, 1776-1861. New York: 
Oxford University Press. 
251Shearer Davis Bowman (2010) At the Precipice: Americans North and South During the Secession Crisis. Chapel 
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economic ramifications of Southern secession for Northern commerce would be so grave as to 
justify military action. Of course, few anticipated the eventual cost of the war. 
The Republicans seized the opportunity to pass the Morrill Tariff in the Senate on 20 
February 1861 after many Southern opponents resigned from the Senate following their states’ 
ordinances of secession. The legislation more than doubled the average tariff rate and was 
popular with Northern manufacturers and labor unions.253 Recognizing that the export-oriented 
Confederacy would keep tariffs low, Northeastern mercantile and financial interests feared a shift 
in foreign trade from Northern ports to Southern ones while the trade between the Northwest and 
Northeast might gravitate south.254 
When Secretary of the Treasury Salmon P. Chase commissioned William Curtis Noyes to 
ascertain the merchant community’s stance on enforcing Federal law on the South, he reported 
back that reinforcing Forts Pickens and Sumter would thrill the business community and “A 
blockade of the ports would… in my judgment have a… good effect in counteracting the 
apprehended evil results of the new tariff; as it will quiet the expectation that all the West and 
North West would import through the Confederate states. This has caused a good deal of alarm 
here among commercial classes and those dependent upon them, such as landlords and 
others.”255 On 19 April 1861, the New York Chamber of Commerce, at the largest meeting of 
members ever held, unanimously embraced war to prevent secession. “Having prospered under 
the Union and believing that the future prosperity depended upon the ‘the maintenance of the 
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United States as one nation,’ there was nothing they could do but to ‘pledge all their substance to 
sustain the Government.’”256 
War fever was not confined to the merchants of the Northeast. Fear of losing access to the 
lower Mississippi Valley animated many Midwesterners. Regarding Midwesterners’ free 
navigation of the river, the Chicago Tribune editorialized, “It is their right and they will assert it 
to the extremity of blotting Louisiana out of the map.”257 So, it appears likely that the Lincoln 
administration’s reason for invading the Confederacy was to protect the Northern states’ share of 
world trade by preventing the shift in foreign trade from Northern ports to Southern ones and 
keeping the Mississippi River open to Northern merchants. This reasoning is reminiscent of that 
of the Western European colonial powers who in the 1940s and 50s believed that their economic 
livelihood depended on protecting metropolitan industries while regulating the trade of their 
colonies to ensure a favorable balance of payments. 
This dissertation identifies the rare circumstances under which democracies militarily 
contest new self-determination movements. However, a topic deserving further research is why 
some secessionist conflicts outlast democratization when there are no enfranchised loyalists 
fearing persecution. One instance is the Insurgency in Aceh (1976-2005), which started during 
Suharto’s military dictatorship, but persisted for seven years after Indonesia’s democratization. 
While one could dismiss the Aceh case by maintaining that non-Western countries invariably 
oppose secession militarily, there are several Western examples too. Spain’s war against Basque 
secessionists (1968-2010), which started during the Franco dictatorship, finally ended with a 
                                                 
256Philip S. Foner (1968) Business and Slavery: The New York Merchants & the Irrepressible Conflict. New York: 
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2010 ceasefire between Madrid and ETA, the main Basque secessionist group. Similarly, 
Georgia’s democratization in the 2003 Rose Revolution did not reconcile it to Abkhazian or 
South Ossetian independence, contributing to the 2008 Russo-Georgian War. So, to minimize 
loss of life, a theory explicating the inertia characterizing some secessionist conflicts could prove 
just as valuable as this dissertation’s model. 
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APPENDIX: DATA TABLE 
 
 Democracy 
Dictatorship
-initiated 
secession 
Loyalist 
population 
Loyalists 
fear 
persecution 
(Enjoy 
privileges) 
Loyalists 
enfranchised 
Government 
permits 
secession 
       
Basque Conflict 
1959-2010 
(Spain) 
0 0 1 0 0 0 
       
Third Franco-
Algerian War 
1954-62 
(France) 
1 0 1 1 1 0 
       
First Sudanese 
Civil War 
1955-72 
(Sudan) 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
       
 Katanga 
Secession 
1960-63 
(Congo-
Leopoldville) 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
       
 South Kasai 
Secession 
1960-61 
(Congo-
Leopoldville) 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
       
Sao Tome and 
Principe 
Independence 
Movement 
1960-74 
(Portugal) 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
       
Portuguese Guinea 
Insurgency 
1961-74 
(Portugal) 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
       
Angolan-
Portuguese War 
1961-74 
(Portugal) 
0 0 1 1 0 0 
       
Eritrean War of 
Independence 
1961-91 
(Ethiopia) 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
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 Democracy 
Dictatorship
-initiated 
secession 
Loyalist 
population 
Loyalists 
fear 
persecution 
(Enjoy 
privileges) 
Loyalists 
enfranchised 
Government 
permits 
secession 
       
First Kurdish-Iraq 
War 
1961-70 
(Iraq) 
0 0 1 1 0 0 
       
Sierra Leone  
1961 
(Britain) 
1 0 0 0 0 1 
       
Kuwait 
1961 
(Britain) 
1 0 0 0 0 1 
       
Dhofar Rebellion 
1962-76 
(Oman) 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
       
Samoa 
1962 
(New Zealand) 
1 0 0 0 0 1 
       
Burundi  
1962 
(Belgium) 
1 0 0 0 0 1 
       
Rwanda  
1962 
(Belgium) 
1 0 0 0 0 1 
       
Jamaica 
1962 
(Britain) 
1 0 0 0 0 1 
       
Trinidad and 
Tobago 
1962 
(Britain) 
1 0 0 0 0 1 
       
Uganda 
1962 
(Britain) 
1 0 0 0 0 1 
       
First Ogaden War 
1963-64 
(Ethiopia) 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
       
Insurgency in 
Northeast India 
1963-present 
1 0 0 0 0 0 
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 Democracy 
Dictatorship
-initiated 
secession 
Loyalist 
population 
Loyalists 
fear 
persecution 
(Enjoy 
privileges) 
Loyalists 
enfranchised 
Government 
permits 
secession 
       
Kenya 
1963 
(Britain) 
1 0 1 1 0 1 
       
Mozambique-
Portuguese War 
1964-74 
(Portugal)a 
0 0 1 1 0 0 
       
Tanzania 
1964 
(Britain) 
1 0 0 0 0 1 
       
Malawi 
1964 
(Britain) 
1 0 0 0 0 1 
       
Malta 
1964 
(Britain) 
1 0 0 0 0 1 
       
Zambia 
1964 
(Britain) 
1 0 1 1 0 1 
       
First West Papuan 
War 
1965-69 
(Indonesia) 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
       
The Gambia 1965 
(Britain) 
1 0 0 0 0 1 
       
Maldives 
1965  
(Britain) 
1 0 0 0 0 1 
       
Singapore 
1965 
(Malaysia) 
1 0 1 0 1 1 
       
Guyana 
1966 
(Britain) 
1 0 0 0 0 1 
       
Botswana 
1966  
(Britain) 
1 0 0 0 0 1 
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 Democracy 
Dictatorship
-initiated 
secession 
Loyalist 
population 
Loyalists 
fear 
persecution 
(Enjoy 
privileges) 
Loyalists 
enfranchised 
Government 
permits 
secession 
       
Lesotho 
1966  
(Britain) 
1 0 0 0 0 1 
       
Barbados 
1966 
(Britain) 
1 0 0 0 0 1 
       
Biafran War 
1967-70 (Nigeria) 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
       
Nauru 
1968 
(Australia 
awarded UN 
trusteeship in 
1923 with Britain 
and New Zealand 
as co-trustees) 
1 0 0 0 0 1 
       
Mauritius 
1968 
(Britain) 
1 0 0 0 0 1 
       
Swaziland 
1968 
(Britain) 
1 0 0 0 0 1 
       
Equatorial Guinea 
1968 
(Spain) 
0 1 0 0 0 1 
       
Moro Insurgency 
1969-Present 
(Philippines) 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
       
The Troubles in 
Northern Ireland 
1969-97 (Britain) 
1 0 1 1 1 0 
       
Tonga 
1970 
(Britain) 
1 0 0 0 0 1 
       
Fiji 
1970 
(Britain) 
1 0 0 0 0 1 
       
Bangladesh 
Independence War 
1971 
(Pakistan) 
0 0 1 0 0 0 
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 Democracy 
Dictatorship
-initiated 
secession 
Loyalist 
population 
Loyalists 
fear 
persecution 
(Enjoy 
privileges) 
Loyalists 
enfranchised 
Government 
permits 
secession 
       
Bahrain 
1971 
(Britain) 
1 0 0 0 0 1 
       
United Arab 
Emirates 
1971 
(Britain) 
1 0 0 0 0 1 
       
Baluchi Separatist 
War 
1973-77 
(Pakistan) 
0 0 1 0 0 0 
       
 Bahamas 
1973 
(Britain) 
1 0 0 0 0 1 
       
Spanish Sahara 
Conflict 
1973-75 
(Spain) 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
       
Second Kurdish-
Iraqi War 
1974-75 
(Iraq) 
0 0 1 1 0 0 
       
Grenada 
1974 
(Britain) 
1 0 0 0 0 1 
       
Namibian War 
1975-88  
(South Africa) 
1b 0 1 1 1 0 
       
Western Sahara 
War 
1975-83 
(Morocco) 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
       
East Timor 
Insurgency 
1975-99 
(Indonesia) 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
       
Comoros 
1975  
(France) 
1 0 0c 0 0 1 
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 Democracy 
Dictatorship
-initiated 
secession 
Loyalist 
population 
Loyalists 
fear 
persecution 
(Enjoy 
privileges) 
Loyalists 
enfranchised 
Government 
permits 
secession 
       
Papua New 
Guinea 
1975 
(Australia) 
1 0 0 0 0 1 
       
Suriname 
1975 
(Netherlands) 
1 0 0 0 0 1 
       
Second West 
Papuan War 
1976-78 
(Indonesia) 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
       
Second Ogaden 
War 
1976-80 
(Ethiopia) 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
       
Aceh Insurgency 
1976-2005 
(Indonesia) 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
       
 Seychelles 
1976 
(Britain) 
1 0 0 0 0 1 
       
 Djibouti 
1977 
(France) 
1 0 0 0 0 1 
       
Solomon Islands 
1978 
(Britain) 
1 0 0 0 0 1 
       
Tuvalu  
1978 
(Britain) 
1 0 0 0 0 1 
       
 Dominica 
1978 
(Britain) 
1 0 0 0 0 1 
       
Saint Lucia 
1979 
(Britain) 
1 0 0 0 0 1 
Kiribati 
1979 
(Britain) 
1 0 0 0 0 1 
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 Democracy 
Dictatorship
-initiated 
secession 
Loyalist 
population 
Loyalists 
fear 
persecution 
(Enjoy 
privileges) 
Loyalists 
enfranchised 
Government 
permits 
secession 
       
Saint Vincent and 
the Grenadines 
1979 
(Britain) 
1 0 0 0 0 1 
       
Zimbabwe 
1980 
(Britain) 
1 0 1 1 0 1d 
       
Vanuatu 
1980 
(Britain and 
France) 
1 0 0 0 0 1 
       
Antigua and 
Barbuda 
1981 
(Britain) 
1 0 0 0 0 1 
       
Belize 
1981 
(Britain) 
1 0 0 0 0 1 
       
First Sri Lanka 
Tamil War 
1983-2002 
(Sri Lanka) 
0 0 1 1 1 0 
       
Kurdish Rebellion 
of 1983 
1983-88 
(Iraq) 
0 0 1 1 0 0 
       
Saint Kitts and 
Nevis 
1983 
(Britain) 
1 0 0 0 0 1 
       
First Turkish 
Kurdish 
Insurgency 
1984-99 (Turkey)e 
1 0 1 1 1 0 
       
Brunei 
1984 
(Britain) 
1 0 0 0 0 1 
Marshall Islands 
1986 
(USA) 
1 0 0 0 0 1 
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 Democracy 
Dictatorship
-initiated 
secession 
Loyalist 
population 
Loyalists 
fear 
persecution 
(Enjoy 
privileges) 
Loyalists 
enfranchised 
Government 
permits 
secession 
       
Federated States 
of Micronesia 
1986 
(USA) 
1 0 0 0 0 1 
       
Bougainville 
Secession War 
1989-92  
(Papua New 
Guinea) 
0 0 1 1 1 0 
       
Dissolution of the 
USSR 1990-91 
0 1 1 1 1 1 
       
Kashmir 
Insurgency 
1990-2005 (India) 
1 0 0f 0 0 0 
       
Macedonia 
1991 (Yugoslavia) 
0 0 0 0 0 1 
       
South Ossetian 
War 
1991-92 (Georgia) 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
       
Ten Day War 
1991 (Yugoslavia) 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
       
Croatian 
Independence War 
1991-92 
(Yugoslavia) 
0 0 1 0 0 0 
       
War of 
Transnistria 
1991-92 
(Moldova) 
0 0 1 1 1 0 
       
Secession of 
Serbian Krajina 
1991-95 (Croatia) 
0 0 1 1 1 0 
       
Bosnian War 
1992-96 
(Yugoslavia)g 
0 0 1 0 0 0 
       
War in Abkhazia 
1992-93 (Georgia) 
0 0 1 1 1 0 
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 Democracy 
Dictatorship
-initiated 
secession 
Loyalist 
population 
Loyalists 
fear 
persecution 
(Enjoy 
privileges) 
Loyalists 
enfranchised 
Government 
permits 
secession 
       
Nagorno-
Karabakh War 
1992-94 
(Azerbaijan)h 
0 0 1 1 1 0 
       
Slovakia 
1993 
(Czechoslovakia) 
1 0 0 0 0 1 
       
South Yemeni 
Secessionist War 
1994 
(Yemen) 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
       
First Chechen War 
1994-96 
(Russia) 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
       
Palau 
1994 
(USA) 
1 0 0 0 0 1 
       
Kosovo 
Independence War 
1998-99 
(Yugoslavia) 
0 0 1 1 1 0 
       
Oromo Liberation 
War 
1999  
(Ethiopia) 
0 0 1 0 0 0 
       
Second Chechen 
War 
1999-2003 
(Russia) 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
       
Al Aksa Intifada 
2000-3 
(Israel) 
1 0 1 1 1 0 
       
Second Sri Lanka-
Tamil War 
2002-2009 
(Sri Lanka) 
1 0 1 1 1 0 
       
Montenegro 2006 
(Yugoslavia) 
1 0 1 0 1 1 
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a COW provides the wrong dates. 
b South Africa was a democracy for its white population, including the whites of South-West Africa (Namibia). 
c Although 8,853 (5.43%) voters preferred to remain part of France, 8,783 of those voters resided in Mayotte, which 
did not secede. Accordingly, there were only 70 loyalists in what would become Comoros. 
d The British government ignored the white minority’s opposition to independence with majority rule, resulting in 
the white minority government unilaterally declaring independence in 1965 and fighting a war against African 
nationalist guerillas until 1980. In 1979, the Rhodesian government submitted again to British rule and London 
granted independence to Rhodesia the following year over the concerns of the white, loyalist minority. 
e The PKK only demanded autonomy during the second insurgency 2004-13. 
f Although the Kashmiri Hindus could vote, they represented such a small fraction of the Indian electorate as to be 
politically irrelevant. That irrelevancy was only compounded by the fact that Kashmir’s Muslim majority could 
also vote in Lok Sabha elections, canceling out whatever influence they Kashmiri Hindu minority might have 
enjoyed. 
g This war began as a Yugoslav attempt to forestall Bosnian secession but transformed into a civil war in which 
multiple foreign powers patronized various factions. 
h Although a low-level conflict erupted in 1988, the full-scale fighting did not commence until 1992. 
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